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Abstract
This paper studies the employment and income effects of a federal proposal in 2016
to expand overtime coverage to additionally cover salaried workers earning between
$455 and $913 per week ($23, 660 and $47, 476 per annum). Although the policy was
unexpectedly nullified a week before its proposed effective date, using detailed admin-
istrative payroll data covering one-sixth of the U.S. workforce, I find clear evidence
that firms nevertheless responded to the policy by bunching workers’ earnings at the
new $913 exemption threshold. On average, the base salary of directly affected workers
who remain employed increased by 1.4%. Meanwhile, for every hundred workers who
would have gained coverage under the policy, 10 jobs were reclassified from salaried to
hourly. Preliminary analysis also suggests that there may have been negative employ-
ment effects. Examining the distribution of these margins of adjustments, I find that
the positive income effect accrued entirely to workers who were bunched at the $913
threshold but would otherwise have earned between $720 and $913 per week, whereas
the reclassification and negative employment effects were spread across jobs paying
within the entire range of newly covered base salaries.
JEL codes: J23, J31, J33, J38
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1 Introduction
A key factor in the determination of employment, wages, and hours in the economy is the
extent to which labor market regulations affect labor demand. Interest in this topic has
sparked a large literature on the labor market impacts of the minimum wage, its implications
for labor market efficiency, and its role in the rise of income inequality (e.g. see Brown,
1999). In contrast, although overtime regulations could potentially impose similarly large
distortions on firms’ employment decisions, far less is known about its effects on the labor
market, especially in the United States. The original motivation for imposing an overtime
premium was the theory that it would encourage firms to spread hours across workers,
thereby reducing the prevalence of long workweeks and increasing employment (Ehrenberg,
1971). However, a competing economic theory argues that in equilibrium, overtime coverage
has no real labor market effects if straight-time wages can lower such that workers earn
the same amount before and after coverage (Trejo, 1991). Underlying these models are core
assumptions about the flexibility of wages and hours. Despite the long history of overtime
regulation in the US, there is still no consensus on the effects of overtime eligibility on the
labor market.
Empirical studies of overtime in the United States have been limited by a lack of clean
policy variation and imprecise data.1 Previous studies, exploiting variation from the expan-
sion of overtime coverage to additional industries and demographic groups, have found a mix
of negative (Costa, 2000; Hamermesh and Trejo, 2000) and no significant effects (Johnson,
2003; Trejo, 2003) of overtime coverage on hours. However, since these expansions in coverage
often coincided with changes in the minimum wage, tests of the income effect of overtime
have instead relied on cross-sectional variation in eligibility to estimate the correlation be-
tween log-wages and overtime hours, by eligibility status (Trejo, 1991; Barkume, 2010).2
While the negative relationship identified in these studies are consistent with firms lowering
wages to partially negate the costs of overtime requirements, they can also be driven by the
selection of low skilled workers into jobs that demand long hours. In addition to the shortage
of clean policy variation, existing studies have also been limited by the level of aggregation
in household surveys. Without measures of employment at a firm or establishment level, it
1See Hart (2004) and Brown and Hamermesh (2019) for an overview of the literature on overtime.
2An exception is Johnson (2003), which studies both the hours and wage effects of a Supreme Court
ruling that extended coverage to public state and local employees. However, the direction of his
estimated wage effects vary depending on the specification.
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is unclear whether one can precisely estimate changes in aggregate employment, even with
an ideal natural experiment. Given these empirical challenges, “no study presents estimates
of effects [of overtime coverage] on employment, and none offers evidence on all outcomes:
[wages, earnings, and hours]” (Brown and Hamermesh, 2019).
My paper fills this gap in the literature by exploiting recent federal and state expansions
of overtime coverage for low-income salaried workers. Labor regulations in the U.S. stipu-
late that salaried workers are legally covered for overtime if they earn below an “overtime
exemption threshold” set by the Department of Labor (DOL). While this threshold varies
across states and over time, the current draft of my paper will study the effects of a specific
attempt to increase the federal threshold.3 In May 2016, the Department of Labor announced
that they would more than double the federal overtime exemption threshold from $455 per
week ($23, 660 per year) to $913 per week ($47, 476 per year). The new rule was scheduled
to take effect starting December 1, 2016 and would have guaranteed overtime coverage to
over a third of all salaried workers. However, one week before the effective date of the new
rule, a federal judge placed an injunction on the policy. Although the new threshold never
went into effect, firms were aware of the the rule change in the period between May 2016
and December 2016, and so had opportunity to respond in anticipation of the new rule.
To evaluate employers’ response to the expectated expansion in overtime eligibility, I ana-
lyze the evolution of the firms’ income distribution following the announcement of the policy
using detailed anonymous monthly administrative payroll data structured at the employee-
employer level. Comparing the frequency distribution of salaried workers’ weekly earnings
between April and December 2016, I find clear evidence that employers attempted to keep
workers exempt from overtime by bunching workers’ salaries at the proposed $913 threshold.
To identify the causal effect of the policy, I model the counterfactual change in the frequency
distribution in 2016 using a linear transformation of the difference between the April and De-
cember 2015 distributions. This enables me to compute the employment effect of the policy
from the difference between the observed and counterfactual difference in distributions.4 In
my analysis, I estimate the employment effects separately for salaried and hourly jobs. Fur-
thermore, I also apply the difference-in-distributions strategy to compute the income effect
of the policy by weighting the frequency distributions by workers’ weekly pay.
I find that raising the overtime exemption threshold reduced aggregate employment but
3I will present the results of the state-year analyses in a subsequent revision of this paper.
4See Cengiz et al. (2019) for a recent analysis of how the minimum wage impacts employment at
different parts of the wage distribution
2
increased average salaries. My current analysis estimates that employment fell by 0.069 (s.e.
0.036) jobs for each salaried worker initially earning between the old and new thresholds.
However, this estimate is sensitive to various sample restrictions that will be explored in
more detail in upcoming revisions of this paper. As such, I am unable to make any conclusive
statements about the effect of the policy on total employment, but my current specification
would suggest that there are negative employment responses.
The negative employment response to the policy is inconsistent with the theory that
overtime legislation stimulates job creation by encouraging firms to reduce long hours and in-
crease employment (Ehrenberg, 1971). Previous tests of this hypothesis have generally found
imprecise negative employment effects of policies outside the US that reduced the standard
number of hours in a workweek (Hunt, 1999; Cre´pon and Kramarz, 2002; Skuterud, 2007;
Chemin and Wasmer, 2009). However, unlike an expansion in overtime coverage, shortening
the workweek only raises the marginal cost per hour of those working no more than the
initial standard weekly hours. For individuals already working overtime, a shorter workweek
only increases their average cost. Thus, the theory predicts that expanding overtime coverage
would have a greater positive effect on employment than shortening the workweek. Never-
theless, I find that the proposed overtime expansion in 2016 yielded negative employment
effects, reinforcing existing evidence that work-sharing policies, implemented through the
regulation of overtime eligibility, are ineffective tools for generating employment.
While the jobs displaced by the policy were paying between $455 and $913 per week, the
weekly wage bill of the average firm only decreased by $73.19 per job lost, implying that
average incomes must have increased. Restricting the sample to only job-stayers, I estimate
that the base pay of the average affected worker increased by 1.4% (s.e. 0.2%). In contrast
to the negative employment effects, which were spread across all newly covered jobs, only
workers who would have otherwise earned between $720 and $913 per week saw an increase
in their weekly earnings. I find no evidence that firms reduce workers’ base pays in response
to having to pay overtime, thereby rejecting the prediction of the “contract model” that firms
reduce workers’ base salaries to compensate the firm for the additional costs of overtime pay
(Trejo, 1991). To rationalize the effects of the policy, I develop a job-search and matching
model wherein firms and workers bargain over jobs’ the weekly base income, weekly hours
and pay classification (i.e. salaried/hourly status). I show that my results are consistent with
the existence of either frictions from wage rigidity or the cost of monitoring workers’ hours,
and that without these frictions, overtime coverage would simply cause workers and firms to
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cut base pay as predicted by the contract model.
Consistent with the existence of labor market frictions, I find that firms also restructured
their production to utilize more hourly workers and fewer salaried workers. Splitting my
sample by salaried and hourly status, I estimate that for each worker directly affected by the
new threshold, 0.100 (s.e. 0.006) workers are reclassified from salaried to hourly. Reclassifi-
cation explains a larger percentage of the decline in the number of salaried workers earning
between the old and new thresholds than either the employment or bunching effects. I find
that the bunching effect primarily benefits workers who remain salaried after the policy,
whereas reclassified workers receive a wage approximately equal to a fortieth of their base
pay prior to reclassification. The reclassification effect suggests that many of the properties
often associated with salaried jobs relative to hourly jobs, such as higher pay, longer hours,
and more flexible work schedules (Mas and Pallais, 2020), may not simply be an intrinsic
feature of jobs’ duties, but also a result of firms’ response to the overtime exemption policy
to classify low-income covered employees as hourly.
The results of my study inform the debate surrounding the many federal and state policies
to increase the overtime exemption threshold. In addition to a recent federal policy that
raised the FLSA threshold to $684 per week on January 1, 2020, many states have also begun
imposing their own thresholds that exceed the federal one.5 Limited by the dearth in research
on this topic, the federal Department of Labor’s cost-benefit analysis of its policy relies
heavily on strong assumptions that incorporate a combination of the predictions from both
theories of overtime, and elasticities from the literature.6 My results reject the predictions
of previous models of overtime, and by extension, many of the conclusions of the DOL’s
analysis. Furthermore, I am able to estimate employment and reclassification effects, which
cannot be extrapolated from elasticities in the literature, even with strong assumptions.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, I explain the institutional
details governing U.S. overtime regulations and the specific policy to expand coverage for
salaried workers. Section 3 outlines the predictions of the two competing models of overtime
and nests them within a general labor demand framework. In section 4, I describe the admin-
5Over the last decade, California and New York incrementally increased their thresholds to $1040
and $1125 per week, respectively. Effective January 1, 2021, Washington and Colorado will raise
their thresholds to $965 and $778.85 per week, respectively. Michigan and Pennsylvania are in the
process of writing proposals for raising their salary thresholds above the federal one.
6For instance, the DOL assumes that of the workers who occasionally work overtime, half would
have both their base salary and hours decreased, and half would receive overtime compensation
with no change in base pay or hours. 84 FR 10900
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istrative payroll data from ADP LLC that I use in this study. In section 5, I present graphical
evidence that the nullified policy had a binding effect. Section 6 outlines my identification
strategy and reports my results on the aggregate employment and income effects. In section
7, I decompose the specific margins by which firms adjust their labor force. I conclude in
section 8 by discussing the implications of my findings and areas for future research.
2 Federal and State Overtime Regulation
The Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) requires employers to record workers’ hours, and
pay them one and a half times their regular rate of pay for each hour worked above 40 in
a week.7 While this rule applies to nearly all hourly workers in the US, the FLSA exempts
a large group of salaried workers from overtime coverage who are considered executive,
administrative, or professional (EAP) employees. To exempt a salaried employee as an EAP,
the employer must show that the worker 1) primarily performs white-collared tasks as defined
by the Department of Labor (duties test), and 2) earns a weekly salary equal to or greater
than an “exemption threshold” set by the DOL (salary levels test).8 Conversely, salaried
workers earning below the exemption threshold, as well as blue-collared salaried workers
earning above the threshold, are covered for overtime pay.
In addition to the federal regulation, multiple states also impose their own overtime
exemption thresholds that exceed the one set by the FLSA. In particular, California, New
York, Maine, and Alaska each define their overtime exemption thresholds as a multiple of
their respective minimum wages. Thus, each time these states raise their minimum wage,
their overtime exemption threshold simultaneously increases according to a known formula.
In all four states, the overtime exemption threshold is high enough such that the segment of
the income distribution affected by changes in the threshold does not overlap with that of
the minimum wage, even after accounting for potential spillovers.9
7For hourly workers, the regular rate of pay is simply their wage. For salaried workers, the regular
rate of pay is defined as their weekly salary divided by the number of hours for which the salary
is intended to compensate (29 C.F.R. § 778.113). In practice, and as verified using payroll data,
firms typically calculate salaried workers’ regular pay rate as their weekly salary divided by 40.
For example, a worker paid a salary of $450 per week has an implied wage of $11.25 = 45040 . If the
worker is covered for overtime, she would receive $16.88 = 1.5 · 11.25 for each hour above 40 that
she works in a given week, in addition to her regular salary of $450.
8The law also makes exceptions for special occupations such as teachers and outside sale employees.
For a detailed overview of the requirements to qualify as an EAP worker or other exemptions,
refer to Face Sheet #17A published by the Department of Labor.
9The smallest scalar factor used to determine an overtime exemption threshold is in Maine, where
5
To identify the effects of expanding overtime coverage, I examine two sources of pol-
icy variation: 1) a rule change in 2016 that would have doubled the federal threshold but
was unexpectedly nullified, and 2) smaller federal and state-level increases in the overtime
exemption threshold. These increases extend overtime eligibility to workers with salaries
between the old and new thresholds who were previously exempt from overtime. I present
in appendix figure 1 all state and federal overtime exemption thresholds since 2005, along
with the invalidated proposal in 2016. While I describe in this section both sources of policy
variation in overtime coverage, my current draft of the paper will present only my analysis
of the large 2016 FLSA policy. The results of my event-study analysis will be included in the
subsequent revision of this paper.
At the federal level, the percent of salaried workers guaranteed overtime compensation
under the FLSA fell from over 50% in 1975 to less than 10% in 2016 (see Figure A.1).
In an attempt to restore overtime coverage to salaried workers, the Department of Labor
announced on May 18, 2016 that it would increase the federal exemption threshold from
$455 per week ($23, 660 per year) to $913 per week ($47, 476 per year) starting December 1,
2016. According to the Current Population Survey, the new rule would effectively raise the
threshold from the 10th percentile of the salary distribution to the 35th percentile. However,
to employers’ surprise, a federal judge imposed an injunction on the policy on November 22,
2016, stating that such a large increase in the threshold oversteps the power of the DOL and
requires Congress approval. Given that this unexpected injunction occurred only one week
before the policy was to come into effect, many companies at the time reported that they
had either already responded to the policy and would not retract those changes, or made
promises to their employees that they intended to keep.10 After confirming that firms did
indeed respond to the nullified policy, I use the 2016 proposal as a natural experiment to
estimate the short-run effects of a large federal expansion in overtime coverage for salaried
workers.
To complement my evaluation of the 2016 FLSA rule change, I implement an event
the threshold is equal to 300052 ≈ 58 times the minimum wage. Assuming a standard workweek of 40
hours, this implies that salaried workers paid at the threshold earn 44% more than the minimum
wage, well above the range that the literature has found spillover effects from the minimum wage
(Brochu et al., 2015; Cengiz et al., 2019).
10For example, WalMart and Kroger raised their managers’ salaries above the $913 threshold and
did not take back those raises after the injunction. See Some Employers Stick With Raises Despite
Uncertainty on Overtime Rule - Wall Street Journal Dec 20, 2016. For a detailed recounting of
firms’ expectations leading up to and following the injunction, refer to appendix section B.
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study analysis using 18 prominent federal and state-level increases in the overtime exemption
threshold between 2014 and 2020.11 Following the injunction of the 2016 rule change, the
federal Department of Labor announced on September 13, 2019 that it would raise the
FLSA overtime exemption threshold to $684 per week, effective January 1, 2020. Unlike
the 2016 policy, the recent increase in the federal overtime exemption threshold did not
affect all states. Since California and New York already had thresholds that far exceeded
the new FLSA requirement, I use these unaffected states as control groups to model the
counterfactual labor market outcomes in the absence of the new rule. Similarly, for each of
the state-specific threshold increases, I am able to use the states that are bound by the FLSA
threshold as a control group.12
In addition to the state-year variation in the overtime exemption thresholds, the nature
of the overtime regulation also provides multiple other sources of variation that can be used
as controls and placebos. These additional sources of variation are particularly important
for identifying the effects of the federal policy in 2016, which affected all states at the same
time. First, each rule change only directly affects salaried workers earning between the old
and new thresholds, and therefore has little effect on workers with incomes much higher in
the salary distribution. Second, the cost of a threshold increase differs by firms depending
on the share of their workforce initially between the old and new thresholds. In particular,
firms with no salaried workers in that range are unaffected by the policy aside from general
equilibrium forces, and can therefore serve as a control. Third, given that some workers paid
between the old and new thresholds were already eligible for overtime pay, I have worker-
level variation by employees’ initial exemption status. Forth, and specific to the 2016 FLSA
regulation, since there were no changes to the federal overtime exemption threshold prior to
2016, I use earlier years as a placebo test to validate my empirical strategy.
While salaried workers who never work above 40 hours per week could arguably also act
as a control, in my analysis, I consider these workers as part of the treatment group. From
a labor demand perspective, one of the main concerns that businesses raised to the DOL
11I exclude the four most recent rule changes in Alaska that cumulatively increased the exemption
threshold by only $35 to adjust for inflation. I also exclude the January 2014 event in New York
due to coding issues with the data.
12Starting in 2017, California and New York passed legislation that generated variation within-
state. California sets a lower threshold for employers with fewer than 26 employees, whereas New
York’s threshold varies by both employer size and location (i.e. in/near/away from NYC). Since
the data I use only records the state of workers’ residence and consists of firms with at least 50
workers, I do not make use of the within-state variation. When a state has multiple thresholds, I
use the largest of its thresholds for my event study analysis.
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in response to the 2016 rule change is the cost of monitoring salaried workers’ hours. Thus,
covering employees who never engage in overtime work nevertheless raises their cost to the
firm. Furthermore, from a labor supply perspective, workers who engage in no more than 40
hours of labor per week may want to increase their hours once they are covered for overtime.
As a practical matter, I also do not observe the hours of salaried workers in the data if they
are not covered for overtime.
3 Theoretical Predictions
To guide my empirical analysis, I examine multiple theories of how overtime coverage may
affect the labor market. The literature has developed two competing theories of overtime. The
standard labor demand model argues that if overtime has no effect on wages, then it would
raise the marginal cost per hour of labor for hours above 40 in a week, thereby incentivizing
firms to substitute away from long hours for more employment (Ehrenberg, 1971). While the
assumption that wages are fixed is highly restrictive, previous attempts to endogenize wages
by integrating labor supply responses have generated intractable predictions (Hart, 2004). To
model overtime in a market equilibrium, a competing theory argues within a compensating
differentials framework that base wages would decrease in response to overtime coverage,
such that total income remains unchanged (Trejo, 1991).13 Under this framework, overtime
coverage would have no effect on real income, hours, or employment. While this model allows
for movement in both wages and hours, it assumes a frictionless environment that may not
be true empirically. Furthermore, both theories of overtime were developed to model the
effect of overtime for hourly workers. They do not make a distinction between salaried and
hourly workers, nor allow for overtime coverage to depend on an exemption threshold.
In this section, I present a search and matching model that captures these institutional
details, and generates a rich set of testable predictions of the labor market impacts of covering
low-income salaried workers for overtime. In the first subsection, I describe the process
by which workers’ income, hours, and salaried/hourly status are determined in my model,
assuming exogenous contract rates and a stationary environment. Next, I examine how these
outcomes respond to the introduction of overtime coverage for salaried workers earning below
13For instance, suppose an employee initially works 50 hours for a salary of $800 each week and
receives no overtime. If this worker becomes covered for overtime, the firm can reduce the worker’s
base salary to $581.82, so that with the 10 hours of overtime, the worker would continue to receive
$581.82 · (1 + 1.550−4040 ) = $800 per week.
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a given threshold, and how these effects differ given fixed costs of monitoring hours or
wage rigidity. Following the comparative statics analysis, I study the dynamic responses
by endogenizing firms’ vacancy creation decision via a matching function formulation (see
Pissarides (2000) for a review of this approach). For conciseness, I focus on the intuition of
the model, and defer formal derivations and proofs to appendix C.
3.1 Search and Bargaining with Exogenous Contract Rates
The basic structure of my model builds on the theory of minimum wage developed by Flinn
(2006). Suppose unemployed workers continuously search for a job and match with potential
employers at an instantaneous rate λ ≥ 0. Each match is characterized by three parameters.
As conventional, I assume each worker-firm match has a idiosyncratic productivity level,
θ. To generate variation in hours and pay classification between jobs, I introduce two non-
standard parameters: a disutility of labor that varies between workers a ∼ H(a), and a
relative value of classifying the job as salary rather than hourly F . The match quality and
salary-fit of jobs follow a joint distribution G(θ, F ).14
When an individual and firm meet, they both observe (θ, F, a) and Nash-bargain over the
weekly income (w), weekly hours (h), and pay classification (S) of the job. If the applicant’s
value of accepting the job, denoted by Ve(w, h), exceeds the value of continued searching
Vn, then the employment relationship is formed. While employed, I assume that workers
do not engage in on-the-job search. If unemployed, the individual continues searching while
receiving an instantaneous utility b. I assume jobs are exogenously destroyed at a rate δ ≥ 0.
The instantaneous discount rate is r > 0. Given these parameters, I characterize the worker’s
value of employment and continued search by the following Bellman equations:
(r + δ)Ve(w, h) = w − a
− 1
ǫ
h1+
1
ǫ
1 + 1
ǫ
+ δVn
rVn = b+ λ
∫
Ve(θ,F )≥Vn
[Ve(w(θ, F ), h(θ, F ))− Vn]dG(θ, F )
where ǫ is the worker’s constant labor supply elasticity. Unlike common search and matching
models, I assume that workers receive a disutility from working longer hours that is additively
14One can think of F as the difference between the benefits (e.g. more flexibility, no need to monitor
hours, etc.) of paying a worker by salary and the costs (e.g. less incentive to work long hours,
etc.). A distribution of salary-fit can be motivated by an agency problem where a worker’s effort
depends on the pay classification chosen by the firm, and the amount of information about effort
and output per hour varies by occupation (Fama, 1991).
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separable from their income.15
I model firms’ production technology as a function of both the match quality and the
hours of labor per week, y = θhβ. Given the parameters (θ, F ) and wage contract (w, h, S),
the firm’s discounted stream of profits is denoted by
J =
θhβ − w + F · sgn(S)
r + δ
where S = 1 if the position is salaried, and S = −1 if hourly, and sgn(·) equals the sign of
its argument. The firm’s production function assumes that the output of each employee is
independent of the output of other employees. This modeling assumption thereby eliminates
the ability of the firm to substitute between hours per worker and number of workers, which
is a necessary feature of the standard labor demand model of overtime to generate positive
employment effects.16
Given (θ, F, a), the Nash-bargained job characteristics is given by
(w, h, S) = arg max
(w,h,S)
[Ve(w, h)− Vn]
α
[θhβ − w + F · sgn(S)
r + δ
]1−α
where α ∈ (0, 1) represents the worker’s bargaining power. This problem has a unique closed-
form solution, which I henceforth denote by (w0, h0, S0). The values h0 =
(
a
1
ǫβθ
) 1
1+1ǫ−β and
S0 = argmaxS{F ·sgn(S)} both maximize the total match surplus. The weekly hours equates
the marginal product per hour of labor with the marginal disutility per hour, ∂J
∂h
= ∂Ve(w,h)
∂h
.
Since the pay classification only enters the firm’s production function, a job is salaried if
and only if F is positive. Given h0 and S0, weekly income is set as a weighted average of the
worker’s surplus and the firm’s surplus, similar to standard applications of the search and
matching model:
w0 = α
(
θh
β
0 + F · sgn(S0)
)
+ (1− α)
(
a−
1
ǫ
h
1+ 1
ǫ
0
1 + 1
ǫ
+ rVn
)
Heterogeneity in (θ, a) generate a joint distribution of weekly income and hours, whereas the
distribution of F generates the share of salaried and hourly jobs.
Since workers only accept jobs where Ve(w, h) ≥ Vn, not all matches will result in employ-
15The predictions of the model are invariant to including a additive preference for pay classification.
16One way of potentially generating this substitution is by introducing diminishing returns to firm-
size via the firm-worker bargaining problem developed by Stole and Zwiebel (1996). Previous
job-search models with firm-size have not included an hours (eg. Acemoglu and Hawkins, 2014)
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ment. For each worker type a and salary-fit F , there exists a critical value θ∗0(a, F ) such that
Ve(w(θ
∗
0, F ), h(θ
∗
0, F )) = Vn and the worker accepts the job if and only if θ ≥ θ
∗
0. Inputting
θ∗ into the worker’s value of unemployment, I derive Vn as a function of model primitives:
rVn = b+ λ
∫
θ≥θ∗0(a,F )
[w0(θ, F, Vn)− a− 1ǫ h0(θ,Vn)1+1ǫ1+ 1
ǫ
− rVn
r + δ
]
dG(θ, F )
3.2 Comparative Statics in Response to Overtime Policy
Equipped with the benchmark model, I explore how the job characteristics (w, h, S) and the
share of matches that become employment contracts change once I introduce an overtime
premium. Henceforth, I make a distinction between base pay and gross pay. Let w present
workers’ weekly base pay, prior to receiving overtime compensation. The worker and firm
bargain over the weekly base pay, weekly hours, and pay classification. However, the worker’s
value of employment and the firm’s profit depend on gross pay g = (1 + η(w,h,S))w, where
η(w,h,S) =


0.5(h−40)
40
if h > 40 and S = −1
1.5(h−40)
40
if h > 40, S = 1, and w < w¯
0 otherwise
(1)
and w¯ represents the overtime exemption threshold.
First, I consider the case with no monitoring costs or wage rigidities. Since neither the
firm’s production technology nor the worker’s preferences change, their agreed upon job
characteristics is equivalent to the benchmark case without an overtime policy. Workers’
base incomes are discounted by a factor of (1 + η(w,h,S)) relative to w0 so that their gross
incomes remains the same: g = w0. Weekly hours, pay classification, and reservation match
quality are the same as the baseline case. This result is analogous to the predictions of the
compensating differentials model of overtime where base income adjusts such that overtime
coverage has no real labor market effects (Trejo, 1991).
Second, I examine the case where it is costly for the firm to monitor workers’ hours.
This cost corresponds to the FLSA’s requirement that employers keep a record of the hours
worked by all employees covered for overtime. Since firms already monitor the hours of hourly
workers, this friction only raises the costs of salaried workers earning less than the overtime
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exemption threshold. The firm’s discounted stream of profits is given by
J =
θhβ − (1 + η(w,h,S))w + F · sgn(S)− C · 1[S = 1, w < w¯]
r + δ
where C is a constant, and 1[S = 1, w < w¯] is an indicator that equals 1 if S = 1 and
w < w¯.17 The monitoring cost does not affect the bargaining outcome of hourly jobs or
salaried jobs that pay above the threshold in the baseline scenario. For newly covered jobs
that if not for the overtime policy would be salaried S0 = 1 and pay w0 < w¯, the monitoring
cost has one of three possible effects on the Nash bargaining solution, depending on the
match quality and salary-fit (θ, F ):
Prediction 1 (Bunching): If the job’s income in the benchmark scenario is sufficiently
close to the overtime exemption threshold (i.e. w¯ − w0 is small), then the Nash bar-
gaining solution is to raise the job’s base income to the threshold and increase weekly
hours.
Prediction 2 (Gain Coverage): If the job is not bunched and it is very costly to make the
job hourly (i.e. 2F > C), then the firm would keep the job as salaried, and change its
base income to w2 =
w0−αC+(1−α)(V OTn −Vn)
1+η(w,h,S)
to adjust for the overtime premium, the loss
in surplus from the monitoring costs, and the change in the worker’s outside option.
Prediction 3 (Reclassification): If the job is not bunched and the cost of reclassifying is
smaller than the monitoring cost (i.e. 0 < 2F ≤ C), then the firm would reclassify the
job as hourly. Its base income becomes w2 =
w0−2αF+(1−α)(V OTn −Vn)
1+η(w,h,S)
.
For a given worker type a, the sign and magnitude of the change in the worker’s outside
option, V OTn − VN , depends on the distribution of (θ, F ) and the proportion of matches
affected by each of the above three responses. If all matches are reclassified or gain coverage,
then V OTn − VN < 0 since workers do not value their pay classification but the added cost
to the employer reduces workers’ weekly earnings. On the other hand, if all matches are
bunched, then V OTn − VN > 0 if and only if the worker values the increase in earnings more
than the loss in leisure. This implies that the base and gross income of reclassified and newly
covered employees can either increase or decrease, depending on the value of V OTn − VN and
the worker’s hours of work.
17Instead of a fixed cost, one can also allow the monitoring costs to vary by job without affecting
the predictions. For example, I can model the relative benefit of being salaried as F = B−C and
the monitoring costs as ρC where 0 < ρ < 1.
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Define a job’s total surplus as the sum of the firm’s profits and the worker’s surplus:
T = J + Ve − Vn. If both the firm and worker accept a job offer, then the total surplus
of the job must be positive. One can show that in the benchmark model, the total surplus
at the acceptance cutoff θ∗(a, F ) is equal to zero. By introducing the overtime exemption
threshold with monitoring costs, the total surplus of salaried jobs with base pays below the
threshold decreases.18 Given a continuous distribution of (θ, a, F ), there exist matches close
to the cutoff that would be accepted in the benchmark model, but result in a negative surplus
in the model of overtime with monitoring costs. These jobs, which are no longer incentive
compatible for either the firm or the worker, are dissolved. This gives a forth prediction of
the effect of expanding overtime coverage for salaried workers:
Prediction 4 (Employment Loss): Firms and workers no longer accept some jobs with
poor match quality (i.e. θ is small) that would have been accepted if there was no
overtime coverage.
The above argument also implies that if all jobs have no rents (i.e. the total surplus
is zero), then the only response to raising the overtime exemption threshold is a decrease
in employment. This result holds for a wide class of labor demand models where firms
pay workers their individual marginal product. In these models, the policy will elevate the
marginal cost of the worker above their marginal product, leading the firm to layoff the
worker. If there are reclassification or bunching effects, then either firms are receiving rents
or the marginal product of each worker depends on the number of workers employed within
the firm.
While the overtime model with monitoring costs predicts no real labor market effects
on hourly workers, I show in appendix C that by introducing wage rigidity, the model gen-
erates incentives to decrease the weekly hours of both hourly and salaried workers with
overtime coverage.19 This nests a key prediction of the classic labor demand model and fits
the empirical observation that there is a spike in the hours distribution at 40 hours per
week (Ehrenberg, 1971). Furthermore, even without monitoring costs, the model with down-
ward nominal wage rigidity generates qualitatively similar predictions to the four discussed
18Intuitively, the Nash bargaining solution in the model with monitoring costs is also feasible in the
benchmark model, but not optimal. Total surplus is maximized at the Nash bargaining solution.
19In contrast to the methods developed in the search literature to generate wage rigidity (see
Rogerson and Shimer (2011) for review), I abstract from modeling the cause of wage rigidity and
focus specifically on its effects by exogenously imposing that w
h
≥ w0
h0
for hourly workers and
w ≥ w0 for salaried workers.
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above. To avoid the cost of overtime, the worker and firm either no longer agree upon an
employment contract, or agree to bunch at the threshold, reclassify pay status, or cut hours.
However, under the wage rigidity model, only employees initially working above 40 hours
per week are affected. Given that I do not observe salaried workers’ hours (see section 4),
credibly distinguishing between the model with monitoring cost and the model with wage
rigidity is beyond the scope of this paper. Instead, I use the predictions of these models to
guide my empirical analysis.
3.3 Labor Market Dynamics with Endogenous Contract Rates
Following the conventional approach in the macroeconomics literature, I endogenize the
job match creation rate by modeling the firm’s decision to create vacancies. Let v be the
number of vacancies per worker in the labor force, and u the unemployment rate. Define
market tightness as k = v
u
. Suppose the job match rate follows a constant returns to scale
technology
m(u, v) = vq(k)
where q(k) = m(u
v
, 1) is the vacancy filling rate from the perspective of the firm. The job
arrival rate (λ in the previous subsection) from the perspective of the worker is m(u,v)
u
= kq(k).
Each employer can create a vacancy at a cost ψ > 0. The expected value of creating a
vacancy, Jv, is characterized by
rJv = −ψ + q(k)σ(Φ)(JF − Jv)
where σ(Φ) is the probability that a match is accepted by both parties,20 and JF is the
expected value of a filled vacancy. Suppose that prior to the announcement of the overtime
policy, the labor market is in steady state where employers created vacancies until Jv = 0.
After the announcement of the policy, the expected value of a match σ(Φ)JF decreases, so
that Jv < 0.
21 In response, firms reduce the number of vacancies, v, until Jv = 0.
To characterize the dynamics of u, I assume that the job loss rate equals the job finding
rate prior to the announcement of the policy: δ(1− u) = kq(k)σ(Φ)u. This implies a steady
20In other words, it is the measure of the set Φ = {(θ, F, a)|θ ≥ θ∗(F, a)}
21Since firms are forward looking, the value of σ(Φ)JF decreases immediately following the policy
announcement, and will continue to decrease until the date that the policy goes into effect.
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state unemployment rate of
u =
δ
δ + kq(k)σ(Φ)
The policy reduces the number of vacancies and the probability that a match is accepted, so
the unemployment rate increases. Since firms and workers are forward-looking, the steady
state adjusts immediately following the announcement of the policy:
Prediction 5 (Forward Looking): There will be fewer new hires of salaried workers earn-
ing between the old and new thresholds following the announcement of the new over-
time exemption threshold, even before it goes into effect.
Intuitively, this prediction holds even if the job destruction rate (i.e. δ) is an endogenous
decision of the firm and incumbent workers have firm-specific human capital. Since layoffs
are instantaneous, the firm would not layoff any workers until the policy goes into effect.
Between the announcement of the policy and the date that it goes into effect, the firm can
either continue hiring workers at the same rate as before, then fire them when the policy
becomes binding, or reduce its hires to avoid the vacancy cost. Given large enough vacancy
costs, firms would choose the latter and I would expect to observe a reduction in hires
immediately following the announcement of the policy. The model also predicts no effect on
layoffs in response to the December 2016 policy since it was never binding.
4 ADP Data
I use anonymized monthly administrative payroll data provided by ADP LLC, a global
provider of human resource services that helps employers manage their payroll, taxes, and
benefits. As part of their business operations, ADP processes paychecks for 1 in 6 workers
in the United States. Their matched employer-employee panel allows me to observe monthly
aggregates of anonymous individual paycheck information between May 2008 and January
2020. The data contains detailed information on each employee’s salaried/hourly status,
income, hours, pay frequency (i.e. weekly, bi-weekly, or monthly), sex, industry, and state
of residence. Given that the overtime exemption threshold varies across states, I partition
the sample by workers in California, New York, Maine, Alaska, and the rest of the United
States (henceforth called FLSA states). In my analysis of the 2016 federal policy, I restrict
the sample to workers in the 46 FLSA states.
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A significant advantage of the ADP data over commonly used survey data or other admin-
istrative datasets is that it records each worker’s standard rate of pay as of the last paycheck
in the month, separate from other forms of compensation and without measurement error.
This enables me to calculate precisely the measure of weekly base pay that determines em-
ployees’ exemption status. For salaried workers, the standard pay rate is the fixed salary they
receive per pay-period irrespective of their hours or performance. Following the Department
of Labor’s guidelines, I compute salaried workers’ weekly base pay as the ratio between their
salary per pay-period and the number of weeks per per-period.22 For hourly workers, the
standard pay rate is simply their wage. As a simple benchmark to compare the weekly base
pay and hourly wage of workers who transition between salaried and hourly status, I define
the base pay of hourly jobs as 40 times the wage.23
The other key measures of income in the data are employees’ monthly gross pay and
monthly overtime pay.24 For a given worker-month, the gross pay variable is defined as the
total pre-tax compensation paid over all paychecks issued to the worker in that month. To
express gross pay and overtime pay in the same denominator as base pay, I normalize them
to the weekly-level following a procedure described in detail in Appendix D. While the ADP
data also has a variable for the total number of hours worked per month, employers only
accurately record this information for hourly employees. The hours of salaried workers are
often either missing or set to 40 per week. Since employers do not have to keep track of
salaried workers’ hours, this limitation is likely endemic to all administrative firm datasets,
and not just the ADP data.
Motivated by the job search model in section 3, I aggregate the data by firm, month,
pay classification, and bins of base pay. To distinguish workers in the “treated” interval from
those above it, I set the new threshold as the left end point of a bin in all my specifications. I
top code base pay at $2, 500 per week. Collapsing the data in this way enables me to measure
the effect of the policy along the entire distribution of base pay, separately for salaried and
hourly jobs. The main outcome variables in my analysis of the employment and income
22For example, a salaried worker with a statutory pay of $3000 per month would have a weekly
base pay of $3000 ∗ 1252=$692.31.
23This is analogous to the common approach in the minimum wage literature to define a salaried
worker’s wage as their weekly earnings divided by 40.
24As discussed in Appendix D, I impute overtime pay from a variable that often reports overtime,
but may also include other forms of compensation. Moreover, since firms are not required to
separately report overtime from gross pay, the imputed monthly overtime pay underestimates the
total amount of overtime paid in the economy.
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effects are the number of workers, total base pay, total overtime pay, and total gross pay
within each classification-bin. In the current version of the draft though, I will only examine
the effects of the policy on the first two outcomes: employment and base pay. I will update
the draft with the other outcomes in future revisions.
Leveraging the matched employer-employee panel structure of the data, I also mea-
sure the flow of workers into, out of, and within firms. Between any two months, I can
categorize workers into either stayers, new hires, or separations. Among stayers, I further
partition the sample by workers who switched pay classifications and those who had the
same salaried/hourly status in both months. Collapsing each of these subsamples by firm-
classification-bin, I construct the frequency distributions for stayers, new hires, separations,
reclassifications, and non-reclassified workers. The effect of the policy on the distribution of
each of these subsamples identifies the specific mechanisms that firms use to adjust to the
policy.
I make three restrictions to the sample of firms in my analysis. First, the entry and exit
of firms in the data reflect both real business formations and the decision of existing firms
to partner with ADP. I find that the flow of firms into the ADP sample deviates from the
Business Formation Statistics published by the US Census.25 To prevent the sample selection
from affecting my estimates, I restrict my main sample to a balanced panel of firms between
April and December of each calendar year in my analysis of the 2016 FLSA policy, and within
six months of each event in the event-study analysis. I show in the appendix that my results
are robust to using an unbalanced panel. Second, I drop the largest 0.1% of firms within each
year since shocks to these businesses have a disproportionately large influence on the results
of my firm-level analysis.26 Third, ADP offers two payroll products, one designed for firms
with at least 50 employees and one for smaller firms. The monthly payroll data that I use in
my main analysis is derived from the former and is therefore by construction, restricted to
businesses with 50 or more employees.
5 Evidence that Firms Responded to the Policy
In this section, I present evidence that although the 2016 policy was never legally binding,
companies nevertheless responded to the proposed overtime exemption threshold. In figure
25For a detailed analysis of the representativeness of the ADP data, refer to (Grigsby et al., 2019).
26This restriction drops 58 firms in 2016, accounting for 11.6% of all workers in the sample that
year. I discuss in appendix G the trade-off to dropping large firms.
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2a, I overlay the frequency distribution salaried workers’ base pay in April 2016 and December
2016, where the frequency in each bin is averaged over the balanced panel of firms that are
observable in both months. Reviewing the graph from left to right, four features stand out.
First, there are very few workers below the old threshold of $455 per week and a noticeable
spike in the distribution at exactly the old threshold in both months. Second, there was a
decrease in the number of workers with base pays between the old and new thresholds
between April and December. The average firm employed 13.19 salaried workers with base
pays between $455 and $913 in April 2016, and only 10.47 such workers in December 2016
- a decrease of 23%. Third, there is a large spike in the distribution at the [913, 933) bin
that appears in December but not April. Forth, there is employment growth above the new
threshold, concentrated at regular intervals in the distribution. These recurring spikes along
the entire distribution correspond to annual salaries at multiples of $5000.
These features are even more evident in figure 2b where I plot the difference between the
two distributions in figure 2a. As a placebo check, I also overlay the difference-in-distributions
between April and December of each year from 2012 to 2015. Consistent with prediction
1 of the job-search model, firms bunched workers’ base salaries at the new $913 overtime
exemption threshold in 2016 but not in any of the four preceding years. Contrary to prediction
2, I do not observe any increase in the number of workers to the left of the old threshold that
would suggest that newly covered workers’ base pay decrease to negate the costs of overtime
and monitoring hours. This potentially suggests that firms face downward nominal wage
rigidity constraints, or the policy significantly increased the value of continued searching. I
explore predictions 1 and 2 more closely in section 6.3.
Replicating the same analysis for hourly workers, figure 2c depicts the frequency distribu-
tion of hourly workers’ base pay in April and December 2016. Compared to salaried workers,
there are nearly twice as many hourly workers and the distribution of their base pay is
more right-skewed. To distinguish the effect of the policy from natural employment growth,
I compare the change in hourly employment in 2016 to its growth in previous years. Figure
2d plots the difference in hourly employment, by base pay, between April and December of
each year from 2012 to 2016. Consistent with prediction 2 that firms reclassify newly covered
workers from salaried to hourly, I find that the number of hourly jobs earning between $455
and $913 increased more in 2016 than any previous year.
As further evidence that the changes in the frequency distribution of salaried workers’
base pay reflect a behavioral response to the nullified policy, I examine its evolution over
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time. Figure 3 plots the salaried distribution of each month in 2016 and 2017, subtracted by
the distribution in April 2016, divided by the total number of firms in the superset of both
months. For example, the December 2016 graph in Figure 3 is similar to the blue line in
Figure 2b, but includes firms that are only observable for one month. I find that the timing
of the growth and decay of the spike at $913 corresponds precisely with the history of the
FLSA policy. After the announcement of the policy in May 2016, firms start reducing the
number of salaried employees between the old and new thresholds, and bunching workers
at the new threshold. This bunching experiences a large increase in December 2016, which
is when the new threshold was supposed to go into effect. Since the new threshold was not
binding, firms slowly stopped bunching workers at the threshold after January 2017. I show
in Appendix figure A.3 that this behavior did not exist between April and December 2015.27
6 Aggregate Employment and Income Effect
6.1 Empirical Strategy
Following recent advancements in the minimum wage literature, I identify the aggregate
employment effects of raising the OT exemption threshold by first estimating its effect on
each bin of the frequency distribution of weekly base pays, and then integrating these ef-
fects across all bins (Cengiz et al., 2019; Harasztosi and Lindner, 2019; Derenoncourt and
Montialoux, 2019). I estimate the impact of the policy on the distribution of salaried and
hourly jobs separately since the predicted effect of raising the overtime exemption threshold
differs significantly between these two distributions. In my analysis, I treat the frequency
distributions within each firm as an independent observation and cluster estimates at the
firm-level.28
My empirical strategy stems from the observation that the shape of the difference-
distributions in figure 2 are remarkably similar in each year prior to 2016. This suggests that
the difference-distribution in 2015 is a reasonable approximation for how the distribution
in 2016 would have evolved if not for the new overtime exemption threshold. To control for
year-specific employment effects, I apply a linear transformation to the difference-distribution
27Unlike the effect of the policy on the salaried distribution, its effect on hourly jobs is more difficult
to graphically observe from the evolution of the frequency distribution of hourly workers over time
(see Appendix figure A.4).
28The effect of the policy on the national distribution is equal to its effect on the average firm,
times the number of firms in the population.
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in 2015 so that the counterfactual employment growth for jobs paying well above the new
threshold closely matches the observed change in employment in 2016.
Formally, let nijkmt be the number of workers employed at firm i, with pay classification
j and base pay in bin k, during month m of year t. I model the number of workers within
each firm-classification-bin in December of year t as follows:
nijk,Dec,t = nijk,Apr,t + αjkt + βjk ·Dt=16 + εijkt (2)
where αjkt represents the average change in the number of workers with classification j and
bin k between April and December of year t, absent the policy. The variable Dt=16 is a
dummy variable for the year 2016 and the coefficient βjk is the causal effect of increasing the
overtime exemption threshold on the number of workers in classification-bin jk.
To separately identify the βjk’s from the αjkt’s, I make two modeling assumptions:
βjk = 0 for every k ≥ k
∗
αjkt = γ1αjk,t−1 + γ0
The first assumption states that the policy has no effect on the number of workers earning
above a cutoff bin k∗. This claim follows immediately from the theoretical model if the policy
has little effect on workers’ value of continued searching. Under this assumption, any change
in employment at the top of the distribution reflects only the effect of economic forces
unrelated to the new overtime exemption threshold. A naive approach would be to conduct
a difference-in-difference analysis using high income jobs as a control group. This strategy
would be valid if employment grows equally across the base pay distribution (i.e. αjkt = αjt).
However, this common trend assumption is inconsistent with the data. Figures 2b and 2d
show that the magnitude of the changes in employment vary along the distribution within
each year.
To model the heterogeneity in employment growth across base pay, the second condition
assumes that the distribution of changes in employment between April and December is
similar across years, up to a linear transformation. This assumption is supported by the
observation in figure 2b that the spikes in the difference-distribution are concentrated in the
same bins each year, and the magnitude of the spikes in any given year are either consistently
larger or consistently smaller than those in 2016.
Under these assumptions, I show in appendix E that an unbiased estimator of βjk for
any k < k∗ is
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βˆjk =
(
n¯jk,Dec,t − n¯jk,Apr,t
)
− γˆ1
(
n¯jk,Dec,t−1 − n¯jk,Apr,t−1
)
− γˆ0
= ∆n¯jkt − γˆ1∆n¯jk,t−1 − γˆ0 (3)
where n¯jkmt is the average nijkmt across all firms, and γˆ1 and γˆ0 are estimated from
∆n¯sal,kt = γ1∆n¯sal,k,t−1 + γ0 + ǫsal,kt (4)
using only salaried workers with bins k ≥ k∗. I restrict the sample to only salaried workers
when estimating equation 4 since changes in employment in the right tail of the hourly
distribution, where there is very little mass, reflect more noise than aggregate employment
fluctuations. To estimate equations 3 and 4, I apply the Delta method to the estimates of
the mean employment across firms that I compute from the following regression:
nijkmt =
∑
j,k,m,t
λjkmtDjkmt + ǫijkmt
where Djkmt is an indicator for pay classification j, bin k, month m and year t.
To develop an intuition for equation 3, notice that if γˆ1 = 1 and γˆ0 = 0, then the treatment
effect of the policy is simply a difference-in-difference using the year prior to the policy as the
control group. On the other hand, if employment growth in year t−1 is uninformative about
the growth in year t (i.e. γˆ1 = 0), then γˆ0 is the average employment growth at the top of the
distribution in year t. In that case, equation 3 is a difference-in-difference between low and
high income jobs within the same year. My estimator nests both these models, and selects
the combination of the two that best predicts the change in employment at the upper tail of
the base pay distribution in year t. To test whether this methodology generates a reasonable
counterfactual for the change in the distributions absent the policy, I run a series of placebo
tests by estimating equation 3 using each pair of adjacent years from 2011 to 2015. Since the
policy did not occur prior to 2016, the estimates of the βjk’s in these placebo tests should
be close to zero.
In practice, when evaluating the effect of the policy on the salaried distribution, I find
that the placebo tests perform better if I assume γ1 = 1 and γ0 = 0 for base pays below $625
in the salaried distribution.29 I therefore impose this restriction in my preferred specification.
I choose bins of size $96.15 = 5000
52
because the spikes in the salaried distribution occur in
29This is consistent with the observation in figure 2b that the difference-distribution exhibits little
variation across years in the left tail of the distribution.
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intervals of annual salaries of $5000. I select a cutoff k∗ = $1778 where I use the 9 bins
greater than or equal to k∗ to estimate equation 4. A benefit of selecting a large k∗ is that
it allows me to test the accuracy of the model by seeing whether it eliminates the spikes
between the new threshold and j∗. As described in section 4, I also restrict the sample to a
balanced panel of firms within each year. I show that my results are robust to each of the
above specification choices in appendices A.6 and A.7.
I estimate the aggregate employment effect of increasing the overtime exemption thresh-
old by summing the effect across all bins less than k∗ = 1778 in both the salaried and hourly
distributions: ∆N =
∑
j,k βˆjk. I estimate the total effect on the wage bill in a similar fashion:
∆W=
∑
j,k βˆ
w
jk, where βˆ
w
jk is estimated from equation 3 by replacing the outcome variable
with the total earnings paid to all workers in classification-bin jk. To interpret the magni-
tude of these effects, I scale the total change in employment and the total change in the wage
bill by the number of salaried workers between the old and new thresholds in April 2016,
which I denote by N sApr,16.
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∆Jobs per Affected Worker =
∆N
N sApr,16
∆Pay per Affected Worker =
∆W
N sApr,16
Another useful statistic is the change in the wage bill for each job lost or gained, which I
define as the ratio of the cumulative wage and employment effects: ∆Pay per Job = ∆W
∆N
.
As this value approaches zero, firms behave as if their total wage bill is budget neutral with
respect to employment. That is, if they lose one worker, they transfer the cost savings onto
the remaining workers.
6.2 Aggregate Employment Effect
I start my analysis by estimating the effect of the raising the overtime exemption threshold
on the frequency distribution of salaried workers. I plot in figure 4a the bin-by-bin treat-
ment effects estimated from equation 3, and the integral of these treatment effects over the
entire distribution. By construction, the identification strategy minimizes the magnitudes of
the treatment effects above $1778. However, it also eliminates the spikes in the distribution
30Since some workers between the old and new threshold were already covered for overtime, another
useful statistic is to normalize the employment effects by the number of workers who never received
overtime prior to April. I will report this is an updated draft of this paper.
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above $913, where the policy is unlikely to have a large effect.31 This suggests that the econo-
metric model successfully removes confounding effects unrelated to the overtime exemption
threshold. Examining the integral of the bin-specific treatment effects, I find that the large
drop in the number of workers between the old and new threshold exceeds the spike in the
number of workers above the new threshold.
As a placebo check, I estimate equation 3 using adjacent years of data between 2011
and 2015, and plots their respective integrals in figure 4b. For comparison, I also plot the
integral of the causal effect in 2016. The placebo checks estimate relatively small effects in
every year prior to 2016, indicating that the counterfactual generated by the econometric
model closely resembles the observed distribution in December of each of those years. To
test the robustness of my results, I also compute the cumulative sum of the treatment and
placebo effects using smaller bin widths (figure A.6a), the same values of γ1 and γ0 below
$625 as above (figure A.6b), an unbalanced panel of firms (figure A.6c), and different cutoffs
j∗ above which I assume βj = 0 (figure A.6d). I find similar results in all cases, though the
integrals of the placebo tests differ from zero when using an unbalanced panel.
I present the estimates of the effect of the policy on the number of salaried workers in
column 1 of table 1. To distinguish the effect of the policy on different segments of the
distribution, I aggregate the bin-by-bin effects over four distinct intervals: base pays that
were always covered for overtime [0,432); base pays that would gain coverage under the new
threshold [432,913); base pays right at the new threshold [913,1009); and base pays above
the new threshold but below the assumed cutoff for zero treatment effects [1009,1778). By
construction, the estimated effect in the omitted interval, [1778,2500), is small.
Raising the overtime exemption threshold decreased the number of jobs between the old
and new thresholds in the average firm by 2.481 (s.e. 0.085), and increased the number of jobs
bunched at the new threshold by 0.739 (s.e. 0.030). There is also a statistically significant
spillover effect above the new threshold that reduced the number of workers by 0.171 (s.e.
0.075). In total, there is a net decrease of 1.955 (s.e. 0.141) salaried positions over the entire
salaried distribution. Relative to the number of workers in the bins directly targeted by the
policy (13.19), the cumulative change in the salaried distribution represents a 14.8% (s.e.
1.1%) reduction in the affected population.
In column 1 of table 1, I also report the effect of the raising the overtime exemption
threshold on the total wage bill paid to salaried workers.32 Qualitatively, these effects mimic
31This is clearer in figure A.5 where I estimate the treatment effect using bin widths of $20.
32The bin-by-bin treatment effects and placebo tests are available in appendix A.8.
23
the effect on the number of salaried workers. The policy had negligible effects below the old
threshold. It reduced the wage bill paid to workers between the old and new threshold by
$1811.33 (s.e. 61.80), increased the wage bill at the new threshold by $686.43 (s.e. 28.60),
and decreased the wage bill paid to workers between the new threshold of $913 and $1009 by
$185.44 (s.e 104.75). In total, the wage bill paid to salaried workers decreased by $1, 247.58
(s.e. 140.54).33
Figure 5a shows the effect of the policy on the number of hourly workers within each
$96.15 bin of weekly base pay. Firms decreased the number of hourly workers in the bin
immediately below the old threshold, and increased the number of workers between $432
and $1009. In total, there is a net increase in the number of hourly workers, but it is less
than the decrease in the number of salaried workers.
To test whether the econometric model described in section 6.1 identifies an appropriate
counterfactual to the observed distribution of hourly workers, I use the model to estimate
the effect of the policy on the frequency distributions of hourly workers in the four years
prior to 2016.34 I show in figure 5b that the large increase in the number of hourly workers
between the old and new threshold is not present in any of the other years. However, the
large dip in employment right below the old threshold exists in 2014. Furthermore, this large
dip is highly sensitive to the inclusion of the largest 0.1% of firms (see appendix G), and
it coincides with the minimunm wage of multiple states($8.4 10.6). To explore this further,
I show in appendix A.7 that the dip is significantly smaller once I restrict the sample to
only states that are only bound by the federal minimum wage ($7.25). Given that the drop
in low-income hourly employment is very sensitive to different sampling selections, I cannot
conclusively estimate the exact effect of the policy on hourly employment. However, I am
confident that there was a net increase in hourly workers, particularly in the range between
the old and new thresholds. In a subsequent revision of this draft, I plan to present other
specifications to model the counterfactual hourly distribution, including using the hourly
distribution from firms that had no salaried workers affected by the 2016 policy as a control
group.
I summarize the effect of the overtime exemption threshold on the number of hourly
33A graphical representation of the cumulative effect on the wage bill, along with placebo and
robustness checks, are available in Appendix A.8.
34The analogous bin-by-bin treatment effects and placebo tests for the base-pay weighted distribu-
tion of hourly workers are available in appendix A.9. The results are qualitatively similar to their
non-weighted counterparts.
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workers and their total wage bill in column 2 of table 1. In response to the policy, the
average firm decreased the number of hourly workers with base pays below the old threshold
by -0.95 (s.e. 0.232), increased the number of workers between the old and new thresholds by
1.686 (s.e. 0.251) and increased the number of workers within $96 above the new threshold by
0.21 (s.e. 0.041). These estimates translate to an additional 0.079 (s.e. 0.032) hourly workers
for each salaried worker directed affected by the new threshold. Qualitatively, the wage bill
effects follow a similar pattern as the employment effects. In total, there was a net increase
of 1.041 (s.e. 0.417) hourly workers and an increase in the total wage bill by $1, 181.02 (s.e.
282.02).35
Summing the estimates in columns (1) and (2), I report in column (3) of table 1 the
aggregate employment and income effects of increasing the overtime exemption threshold.
Consistent with prediction 4 of the job-search model, I find a negative employment effect
significant at the 10% level. My estimates allow me to rule out, with 95% confidence, any
employment effects less than -0.138 or greater than 0.03 for each worker directly affected
by the new threshold. However, the entire decrease in employment can be explained by the
drop in hourly workers earning right below the old threshold. As described earlier, while
my current specification suggests a negative employment effect, I would caution against
making any conclusive statements regarding the net employment effect with testing further
specifications first.
Despite the significant employment effects estimated in this model, the total weekly
wage bill of the average firm only decreases by a statistically insignificant $5.05 per affected
worker, or $73.19 for each job lost. The change in the total wage bill equals the difference
between the raises given to workers who are employed and the labor costs saved from reducing
employment. Given that the policy affected salaried workers earning at least $455 per week,
the comparatively small drop in the wage bill per job lost suggests that a large part of the
money saved from reducing employment was paid out to workers who remain employed.
6.3 Income Effect on Affected Workers
To directly estimate the effect of raising the overtime exemption threshold on workers’ in-
come, I use the matched employer-employee structure of the data to split the sample by new
hires, separations, and stayers. By focusing specifically on continuously employed workers, I
35Recall that the wage bill is calculated under the assumption that all hourly workers work 40 hours
per week.
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identify the change in the total wage bill due to an income effect, separate from any changes
due to employment. This overcomes a methodological limitation of the minimum wage study
by Cengiz et al. (2019), which extrapolates the average income effect from changes in the
total wage bill by assuming that the wage effect on workers entering and exiting employment
is the same as the wage effect on workers who remain employed.36 While that assumption
may be valid for small minimum wage changes, it does not hold in my setting where the pre-
dicted effect of the policy varies depending on workers’ base income relative to the overtime
exemption threshold.
One concern with restricting the sample to workers who remain employed between April
and December is that by conditioning on an outcome variable, the stayers in 2015 may
no longer be a reasonable counterfactual to the stayers in 2016. For instance, if the policy
causes firms to disproportionately layoff low-income workers, then my empirical strategy
would compare the evolution of base pays between two groups with different average initial
incomes. I show empirically that this selection problem is small and unlikely to significantly
bias my estimates of the income effect.
I plot in figure 6 the frequency distribution of salaried workers who separate from their
employers between April and December of each year between 2012 and 2016. Although there
are more separations in the upper end of the distribution in 2016 than in previous years, there
are actually slightly fewer separations below the new threshold. Hence, raising the overtime
exemption threshold had little effect on the number of layoffs between April and December. I
present evidence in section 7 to show that the decrease in aggregate employment is primarily
driven by a decrease in new hires. Since the policy did not significantly affect the probability
of layoffs, conditioning the sample on stayers does not bias the difference-in-distribution
estimates.
I use the method outlined in section 6.1 to estimate the income effect on job-stayers
who are paid by salary in April 2016.37 I plot the these estimates along the entire base pay
distribution in figure 7a. As a placebo test, I show in figure 7b that the econometric model
36In their study, the average wage effect is calculated as W−1+∆W
N−1+∆N
/W−1
N−1
− 1, where W−1 and N−1
are the total wage bill and total number of affected workers before the policy change, respectively.
37The model performs poorly on the placebo tests when evaluating the effect on hourly job-stayers.
The econometric model relies on the distribution being stable over time up to a linear transfor-
mation. While this may be true for the total number of hourly workers, it does not hold for the
subset of job-stayers. One potential explanation for this is that the turnover of hourly workers
exhibits large variability from year-to-year, which in turn affects the variability of job-stayers.
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estimates small effects in the years prior to 2016.38 Consistent with prediction 1 of the job-
search model, only workers with base salaries close to $913 per week are bunched at the new
overtime exemption threshold. Raising the overtime exemption threshold caused firms to
bunch workers who would otherwise have earned between $720 and $913 per week. I do not
find any effect on the number of job-stayers earning below $720 per week. Furthermore, the
absence of any positive effects below the new threshold rejects a feature of predictions 2 and
3 that firms would decrease workers’ base salaries to nullify the costs of paying overtime.39
I report the bin-specific treatment effects and their corresponding pay-weighted estimates,
aggregated over four intervals, in column (4) of table 1. As expected, there is a statistically
significant movement of workers from between the old and new threshold to above the new
threshold. This bunching increased the average firm’s total wage bill by $113.89 (s.e. 17.45).
Dividing the increase in the wage bill by the wage bill paid to all salaried workers earning
between $455 and $913 in April 2016, I calculate that the new threshold raised the average
affected worker’s income by 1.2% (s.e. 0.2%).
7 Effect on the Flow of Workers Between and Within Firms
The aggregate employment effects imply that firms substitute hourly workers for salaried
workers in response to a higher overtime exemption threshold. However, it is unclear whether
firms make this transition by laying off their salaried workers and hiring new hourly ones, or
by simply reclassifying existing workers. Furthermore, it is uncertain how these mechanisms
vary by workers’ initial salaries. Just as the positive income effects are concentrated among
workers earning close to the new threshold, the employment and reclassification effects may
also vary across the distribution of affected workers. In this section, I use the panel structure
of the data to measure the specific margins by which firms adjust to the policy proposal in
2016, and how these adjustments vary across the distribution of base pays.
7.1 Decomposing the Net Effect into the Effect on Flows
Between any two months, the number of workers within each firm-classification-bin can
change through a combination of three channels: the flow of workers in and out of the firm
(i.e. employment), the flow of workers between hourly and salaried status (i.e. reclassifica-
38Due to the linear transformation used to generate the counterfactual distribution, the cumulative
treatment effects do not sum to exactly zero.
39This is the also the key prediction of the compensating differentials model of overtime.
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tion), and the flow of workers between different base pays within the same pay classification
(i.e. wage adjustment). Let ∆nempijkt , ∆n
reclass
ijkt , and ∆n
within
ijkt denote the net flow of workers
into firm i, classification j, bin k between April and December of year t via employment,
reclassification, and wage adjustment, respectively. I show formally in Appendix F that the
difference in the total the number of workers between April and December can be decomposed
into the sum of these three factors:
∆ntotalijkt = ∆n
emp
ijkt +∆n
reclass
ijkt +∆n
within
ijkt
In addition, each of the net flows can be further decomposed into an inflow and an outflow
relative to the firm-classification-bin.
Following the methodology described in section 6.1, I estimate the effect of raising the
overtime exemption threshold on each net flow variable using equations 3 and 4. As before,
I evaluate the fit of the model by estimating the effect of the policy on each of the flow
measures in the four years prior to 2016. To minimize the magnitude of the placebo effects,
I set different restrictions on the parameters of the linear transformation, γ0 and γ1, for
each outcome that I analyze. When evaluating the effect of the policy on flows due to wage
adjustments within the same pay classification, I follow the strategy described in section 6.1:
I estimate γ0 and γ1 from equation 4 using bins greater than or equal to k
∗ = $1778, and
I set γ0=0 and γ1=1 for all bins less than $625. To estimate the effect of the policy on net
employments flows, I select a cutoff of k∗ = 1586 and do not restrict γ0 or γ1 for any bins.
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In my analysis of net reclassification flows, I restrict γ0=0 and γ1=1 for all bins.
41 Similar to
section 6.1, I estimate the effect of the policy on each flow into the hourly distribution using
the same γ0 and γ1 that I use to estimate the analogous flow into the salaried distribution.
7.2 Estimates of Flow Effects
Figure 8 presents the distributional effects of the overtime exemption threshold on the net
employment of salaried workers, net reclassification into the salary and hourly distributions,
and the net flow of workers within the salary distribution between April and December
2016. It is evident from figure 8a that there are negative employment effects throughout the
40While I select a smaller cutoff for k∗ than in section 6.1 to shrink the placebo effects, the estimates
of the treatment effects in 2016 are very similar for a wide range of cutoffs. The placebo effects
are sensitive to the cutoff because the shape of the distribution of net employment flows exhibits
more variation between years compared to the distribution of salaried workers (see figure A.10a).
41I show in figure A.11a that the net reclassifications is very stable over time for all bins.
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entire segment of affected workers. However, without knowing the employment flows into
the hourly distribution, it is unclear from this analysis whether total employment increased
or decreased. nevertheless, these employment effects are small relative to the reclassification
effects presented in figure 8b. The bulk of the decrease in the number of salaried workers is
due to reclassification. Furthermore, the distribution of net reclassifications into the hourly
distribution has a very similar shape to the negative of the net reclassifications into the
salaried distribution. This suggests that firms are paying their reclassified workers a wage
equal to their previous salary divided by 40. The similarity between these two distributions
is inconsistent the hypothesis of the contract model that firms would cut workers’ base pays
in response to the overtime requirement. Lastly, although bunching of new hires accounts
for part of the spike at $913, figure 8c shows that the largest share of the spike is due to
the bunching of salaried workers with initial base pays between $720 and $913 who remain
salaried in December, consistent with the evidence presented in figure 7.
To validate the econometric model used to estimate these flow effects, I test how well it fits
the distribution of flows in the years prior to 2016. Although the cumulative placebo effects
on net employment flows into the salaried distribution do deviate from zero, these effects are
small compared to the effect in 2016 and do not show any systematic bias in either direction
(see figure A.10b). I show in appendices A.11b, and A.12b that the policy had negligible
effects on net reclassification and wage adjustment flows into the salaried distribution in
the placebo years, respectively. Similarly, the model also estimates small reclassification
effects into the hourly distribution in the years prior to 2016 (see figure A.14). However, the
placebo effects strongly deviate from zero when evaluating the effect of the policy on the net
employment and wage adjustment flows into the hourly distribution (see figures A.13 and
A.15).42 I do not present estimates of the policy’s effect on flow variables that do not pass
the placebo test.
I summarize the effect of the policy on each of the flows into the salary distribution
in columns (1) to (3) of table 2. Column (1) reports that 0.032 (s.e. 0.006) salaried jobs
were lost to unemployment for each worker directly affected by the new threshold. This is
approximately half the size of the aggregate employment effect estimated in section 6. In
theory, the sum of the employment flows into the salaried and hourly distributions equals the
total change in employment:
∑
j,k∆n
emp
ijkt =
∑
j,k∆n
total
ijkt . While this may indicate that the
policy also cut hourly jobs, in practice, the identify may not hold because I use a different
42This likely reflects volatility in turnover rates between years. Even if the net number of hourly
workers is stable, the number of stayers, hires and separations may not be.
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linear transformations to estimate the flow effects and aggregate effects.
Decomposing the net employment flows into hires and separations, I find the the negative
effect on net employment flow is primarily driven by changes in firms’ hiring decisions. As
discussed in section 6.3, the policy had little effect on the number of separations between
April and December 2016. In contrast, I show in figure 9 that there are noticeably fewer new
hires between the old and new thresholds in 2016 compared to previous years. Furthermore,
workers that do get hired are more likely to be bunched at the new threshold compared
to previous years. Consistent with prediction 5 of the job search model, this implies that
employers are forward-looking and slowed down their hiring of affected workers before the
new overtime exemption threshold went into effect. This result is similar to recent findings
that firms cut employment in response to the minimum wage via a reduction in hires rather
than an increase in layoffs (Gopalan et al., 2018).
Column (2) of table 2 indicates that among the set of workers continuously employed
as salaried, raising the threshold decreased the number of workers with base pays between
$432 and $913 by 0.606 (s.e. 0.028) and increased the number of workers between $913 and
$1009 by 0.634 (s.e. 0.013).43 Scaling the bunching at the threshold by the initial number of
workers between the old and new thresholds, I find that firms bunched 4.8% of all stayers
directly affected by the policy. The total wage bill paid to always-salaried workers increased
by $107.13 (s.e. 19.89), which translates to a 1.5% (s.e. 0.003%) increase in their average
base pay. Since jobs that firms choose to reclassify are different from jobs that stay salaried,
this effect on average base pay includes selection-bias, albeit small given that the number of
always-salaried workers is nearly 8 times that of reclassified workers.
Column (3) of table 2 reports the estimates of the net reclassification effects into the
salaried distribution. In response to the policy, the net number of reclassifications into
salaried status decreased by -1.318 (s.e. 0.083). This is equivalent to -0.100 (s.e. 0.007)
workers for each directly affected worker. Although the choice of γ0 and γ1 differ in each
application of the econometric model, it is comforting to see that the sum the employment
and reclassification effects is not significantly different from the total change in the number
of salaried workers. The magnitudes of the estimates also makes it clear that the bulk of
the decrease in salaried workers is due to reclassification. A ratio of the reclassification effect
43By construction, the change in the total number of always-salaried workers should be zero. How-
ever, since the econometric models uses a linear transform of the 2015 distribution to identify a
counterfactual distribution, the sum of the difference between the observed and predicted distri-
butions do not necessarily equal zero.
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to the total effect suggests that at least 67% of the decrease in salaried workers is due to
reclassification.
To understand whether the change in net reclassification is driven by an increase in flows
from salaried-to-hourly or a decrease in flows from hourly-to-salaried, I plot the distribution
of reclassifications separately by the direction of the flow, and compare these distributions
over time. I observe in figure A.11 that the majority of the net reclassification effect is due
to firms changing workers from salaried to hourly status. In the years leading up to 2016,
most reclassifications were from hourly to salaried, possibly reflecting promotions, but this
trend reversed in 2016 with a large increase in the number of workers being reclassified from
salaried to hourly.
By reclassifying workers from salaried to hourly, firms reduced the wage bill paid to
salaried workers by $989.31 (s.e. 73.59). In comparison, column (4) of table 2 reports that
the reclassifications increased the wage bill paid to hourly workers by $1008.09 (s.e. 71.21).44
The net change in the wage bill of all workers in the sample who were reclassified between
April and December 2016 is $18.79 (s.e. 10.48) (see column (5)). In other words, reclassified
workers experienced a 0.014% (s.e. 0.008%) increase in their base pay.
7.3 Alternate Specification Check: Difference-in-Difference
In this subsection, I compare my main difference-in-distributions results to estimates from a
standard difference-in-difference design where I follow the group of directly affected workers
over time. The treatment group in this specification are salaried workers in 2016 with base
pays between $455 and $913 in April 2016, and the control group are salaried workers in the
same income bracket in April 2015.45 This allows me to test the robustness of my main results
to an alternative identification strategy that only assumes that absent the policy, salaried
workers in the $455 to $913 pay range would evolve similarly in both 2015 and 2016. Unlike
the difference-in-distributions approach, this method takes no stance on the evolution of
employment across the base pay distribution. However, one limitation of following workers
44I count workers whose status transitions from or to missing in my measure of net reclassification
flows. This explains why the cumulative number of jobs reclassified into hourly status does not
equal the negative of the cumulative number of jobs reclassified into salaried status. Given that
the sum of the net reclassifications is less than one, I am underestimating the income effects of
the policy for reclassified workers.
45Alternatively, one could use salaried workers in 2016 with base pays greater than $913 as the
control group. However, I find that the outcome variables for this group has a significantly different
pre-trend than for individuals earnings within the treated interval.
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over time is that it misses any effect on the hiring rate, which according to the previous
results, is the main source of the negative employment effects among salaried workers.
I estimate the following difference-in-difference specification:
yqrt = αt + γr +
k=12∑
k=−12
k 6=−1
βk(1[t = 2016]x1[r = k]) + εqr (5)
where yqrt is the dependent variable for worker q in the r
th month since May of year t. A
worker is in the treatment group if t = 2016, indicating that they earned between $455
and $913 in April 2016. I control for a treatment group fixed-effect αt and event time fixed-
effects γr. The coefficients of interest are βk, which measure the average difference in outcome
between the treatment and control groups k months from May of their respective sampling
years. In my evaluation of the effect of the policy on base pay and salaried/hourly status,
I restrict the sample to workers who are continuously employed at the same firm for a year
before and after the event date.
I plot the raw time series graphs and the difference-in-difference estimates in appendix H.
Figure H.1 shows that salaried workers in 2016 are more likely to be employed at the same
firm before April and more likely to leave the firm after April, compared to salaried workers
in 2015. While the difference in the survival curves fails the common trend assumption,
the linear pre-trend does not appear to be affected by the expectation of the new overtime
exemption threshold. This affirms the previous result that the policy had little effects on
worker separations.
The difference in the evolution of base pays also exhibits a negative pre-trend prior to
April (see figure H.2). Nevertheless, the timing and shape of the base pay effects are clear
indications that increasing the overtime exemption threshold had a positive income effect on
affected workers. Workers in 2015 and 2016 have similar salaries from January to August, but
then from September onwards, the base pay of affected workers begins to rise significantly,
culminating with a large jump from November to December, and then remaining relatively
stable afterwards. The estimate in December implies that raising the overtime exemption
threshold increases the weekly base pay of affected workers by 0.8% (s.e. 0.05%) on a base of
$738.05, which is smaller than the earlier estimate of 1.2% from the difference-in-distributions
analysis but does not include spillover effects.
To identify spillover effects, I estimate equation 5 for workers with base pays between
$913 and $1113 in April 2016, using similarly defined workers in 2015 as the control group.
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These two groups do share a common trend in base pay prior to the announcement of the
new overtime exemption threshold. I find that the policy raised the weekly base pay of these
workers by 0.1% in December 2016 (see appendix H.3).
I also use equation 5 to estimate the effect of the policy on affected workers’ probability
of being reclassified (see appendix H.4). My estimates imply that the policy increased the
probability of a salaried worker in April 2016 becoming hourly in December by 7.6 percent-
age points (s.e. 0.04 p.p.), from a base of 2% for similarly defined workers in 2015. While
the 7.6 p.p increase in reclassifications is smaller than the estimate from the difference-in-
distributions approach, it also omits any reductions in the reclassification of hourly workers
as salaried. Overall, the difference-in-difference estimates of the employment, income, and
reclassification effects on directly affected workers are consistent with the estimates from the
difference-in-distribution analysis.
8 Discussion and Conclusion
This paper presents new facts that inform the policy debate on whether or not to expand
overtime coverage. Existing cost-benefit projections by the Department of Labor, which
draws from previous studies in the literature, are unable to infer the direction of the employ-
ment effect. I show in my paper, albeit inconclusively, that the policy potentially decreased
aggregate employment.
While the policy may have decreased the number of jobs in the economy, it also increased
the average base pay of remaining workers by 1.2% (s.e. 0.2%). This is larger than the
DOL’s 2016 assessment of the policy, which predicted that the average affected worker would
experience a 0.7% increase in their weekly earnings after including overtime compensation.
In terms of base pay, the DOL calculated that only about 2% of affected workers would be
bunched above the threshold, while 18% of workers would experience a 5.3% decrease in their
regular rate of pay, as predicted by previous evaluations of the “contract model” of overtime
(Trejo, 1991). However, I find no evidence that firms reduced workers base pays in response
to being covered for overtime. Instead, I show that the only effect on the distribution of
job-stayers is the bunching of some workers who would otherwise earn between $720 and
$913 per week to above the new threshold. In further contrast to the analysis by the DOL, I
find that the policy increased the number of reclassifications from salaried to hourly status
by 0.1 (s.e. 0.006) per directly affected worker, whereas the DOL assumed this effect to be
negligible. Whether workers prefer to be paid a fixed salary or an hourly wage though, is an
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open question that deserves further research.
Another question that deserves further attention is the effect of raising the overtime
exemption threshold on workers’ hours. Unfortunately, this is challenging to observe in ad-
ministrative payroll data as firms seldom record the hours of salaried workers. To address
this issue, I tried estimating the hours effect using self-reported data from the Current Pop-
ulation Survey (CPS). However, due to sampling error, I am unable to even replicate any
of the bunching, income, or reclassification effects from the main analysis of the paper (see
appendix I). Thus, while survey data may be potentially useful in measuring salaried work-
ers’ hours, it is uncertain whether they have the precision to accurately capture the effects
of the policy.
Although my paper offers the most comprehensive assessment of the FLSA overtime ex-
emption policy to date, there exist many avenues for future research that are beyond the
scope of this study. First, given that this paper examines a policy that was suspended be-
fore its inaugural date, it is uncertain whether a binding policy will have a different effect.
In particular, it would be valuable to study the long-term impacts of raising the overtime
exemption threshold. I will accomplish this in a subsequent revision of this draft that will
include a detailed analysis of the state-level changes in the overtime exemption threshold.
Second, similar to the minimum wage literature, it is worth exploring the relationship be-
tween the depreciation in the overtime exemption threshold over the past 30 years and the
growing wage inequality over the same period. Lastly, while this paper does not take a stand
on the normative implications of the trade-off between aggregate employment and average
earnings, it would be an interesting avenue of research to model the welfare impacts of this
trade-off and applying it to the overtime exemption threshold.
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Figure 1: Variation in State-Specific Overtime Exemption Thresholds
Notes: This figure shows the binding overtime exemption threshold in each state between 2005 and
2018. All states not included in the graph are covered by the federal overtime exemption threshold.
The line ”2016 FLSA” represents the threshold that was supposed to go into effect on December 1,
2016 but was nullified in November 2016. In Alaska and California, the threshold equals 80 times
the state minimum wage. In Maine, the threshold equals 3000/52 times the minimum wage. In New
York, the threshold was 80 times the minimum wage up until December 2016. Starting in January
2017, the threshold in New York varies by county and size of employer. I plot the threshold faced
by employers with more than 11 employees in New York City, which is the highest threshold in the
state.
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Figure 2: Frequency Distribution of Base Pay, by Pay Classification
(a) Frequency Distribution of Salaried Workers (b) Difference in Distribution of Salaried Workers
(c) Frequency Distribution of Hourly Workers (d) Difference in Distribution of Hourly Workers
Notes: Panel (a) shows the frequency distribution of weekly base pay (as defined in section 4) of salaried workers in April and December
2016, scaled by the number of firms in the balanced sample. The blue line represents the distribution in April and the red line represents
the distribution in December. The first bin has a width of $12.99. All other bins have width $20. The distributions are truncated at
$2497. The vertical black dashed line is at the bin containing the overtime exemption threshold in April ($455), while the red dashed line
is at the bin containing the proposed threshold for December ($913). Panel (b) shows the difference between the frequency distribution
of salaried workers’ base pay in December and April, by year. The last bin counts all workers with base pays≥$2513. Panels (c) and (d)
are the hourly worker analog to panels (a) and (b), respectively, collapsed over $40 bins.
38
Figure 3: Frequency Distribution of Salaried Workers by Month, Differenced by the Distribution in April 2016
Notes: The figure shows the frequency distribution of weekly base pays in each month of 2016 and 2017, subtracted by the frequency
distribution in April 2016. For each month, I scale the distribution by the number of firms in the superset of all firms that appear in the
data that month and in April 2016. Within each graph, the bins are $20 wide except for the first bin which goes from $0 to $12.99. The
vertical black dashed line is at the bin containing the overtime exemption threshold in April ($455), while the red dashed line is at the
bin containing the threshold ($913) that was supposed to go into effect on December 1, 2016.
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Figure 4: Effect of Raising the OT Exemption Threshold on the Frequency Distribution of
Salaried Workers’ Weekly Base Pay
(a) Estimates of the Effect on Number of Salaried Workers
(b) Placebo Test of Effect on Salaried Distribution
Notes: Each bar in panel (a) shows the effect of the policy on the number of salaried workers in
each $96.15 bin in Dec 2016. The treatment effects are estimated using equation 3. The solid blue
line is the running sum of these effects. The x-axis ticks denote the starting value of each bin.
Panel (b) shows the cumulative effect of raising the OT exemption threshold on the number of
salaried workers in December of each year between 2012 and 2016. The solid blue line in panel (b)
is the same as the solid blue line in panel (a). The dotted graphs are similarly defined running
sums, except the effect of the policy is estimated using the December and April distributions of the
labeled year and the preceding adjacent year. In both graphs, the vertical black and red lines are
at the start of the bins that contain the old and new OT exemption thresholds ($455 and $913),
respectively.
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Figure 5: Effect of Raising the OT Exemption Threshold on the Frequency Distribution of
Hourly Workers’ Weekly Base Pay
(a) Estimates of the Effect on Number of Hourly Workers
(b) Placebo Test of Effect on Hourly Distribution
Notes: Each bar in panel (a) shows the effect of the policy on the number of hourly workers in each
$96.15 bin in Dec 2016. The treatment effects are estimated using equation 3. The solid blue line is
the running sum of these effects. The x-axis ticks denote the starting value of each bin. Panel (b)
shows the cumulative effect of raising the OT exemption threshold on the number of hourly workers
in December of each year between 2012 and 2016. The solid blue line in panel (b) is the same as
the solid blue line in panel (a). The dotted graphs are similarly defined running sums, except the
effect of the policy is estimated using the December and April distributions of the labeled year and
the preceding adjacent year. In both graphs, the vertical black and red lines are at the start of the
bins that contain the old and new OT exemption thresholds ($455 and $913), respectively.
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Figure 6: Distribution of Separations Between April and December, Salaried Workers
Notes: The figure shows the frequency distribution of base pays in April of each year between 2012
and 2016, averaged across firms, for salaried workers who separate from their employer between
April and December.
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Figure 7: Effect of Raising the OT Exemption Threshold on the Frequency Distribution of
Salaried Job-Stayers
(a) Estimates of the Effect on Number of Salaried Workers
(b) Placebo Test of Effect on Salaried Distribution
Notes: The sample is restricted to workers who are paid by salary in April and are employed at
the same firm in both April and December. Each bar in panel (a) shows the effect of the policy
on the number of job-stayers in each $96.15 bin in Dec 2016. The treatment effects are estimated
using equation 3. The solid blue line is the running sum of these effects. The x-axis ticks denote
the starting value of each bin. Panel (b) shows the cumulative effect of raising the OT exemption
threshold on the number of job-stayers in December of each year between 2012 and 2016. The solid
blue line in panel (b) is the same as the solid blue line in panel (a). The dotted graphs are similarly
defined running sums, except the effect of the policy is estimated using the December and April
distributions of the labeled year and the preceding adjacent year. In both graphs, the vertical black
and red lines are at the start of the bins that contain the old and new OT exemption thresholds
($455 and $913), respectively. 43
Figure 8: Decomposing the Effect of Raising the OT Exemption Threshold on the Income Distribution of Salaried Workers
(a) Effect on Net Employment (b) Effect on Net Reclassifications
(c) Effect on Always-Salaried Workers
Notes: Each graph in this figure shows the average effect of the policy on the flow of workers into each bin of the salaried distribution
(the blue bars) and the cumulative sum of these effects (the blue line). Figure (a) plots the effect of the policy on the net flow of workers
from unemployment. Figure (b) plots the effect on the number of salaried workers in each bin due to reclassifications (in blue) and the
effect on the number of hourly workers in each bin due to reclassifications (in red). Figure (c) plots the effect on the net flow of workers
within the salary distribution. The vertical black and red lines are at $432 and $913, respectively.
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Figure 9: Distribution of New Hires Between April and December, Salaried Workers
Notes: The figure shows the frequency distribution of base pays in December of each year between
2012 and 2016, averaged across firms, for newly hired salaried workers between April and December.
45
Figure 10: Distribution of Reclassifications Flows In and Out of the Salaried Distribution
(a) Reclassifications from Salaried to Hourly
(b) Reclassifications from Hourly to Salaried
Notes: Figure (a) shows the frequency distribution of base pays in April of each year between 2012
and 2016, averaged across firms, for workers who are salaried in April, hourly in December, and
employed in the same firm in both months. Figure (b) shows the frequency distribution of base
pays in December of each year between 2012 and 2016, averaged across firms, for workers who are
hourly in April, salaried in December, and employed in the same firm in both months.
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Table 1: Effect of Raising the OT Exemption Threshold on Employment and Income
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Salaried Hourly Pooled Stayers
Number of Jobs
[0,432) -0.043 −0.950∗∗∗ −0.992∗∗∗ -0.030
(0.045) (0.232) (0.238) (0.24)
[432,913) −2.481∗∗∗ 1.686∗∗∗ −0.795∗∗∗ −0.626∗∗
(0.085) (0.251) (0.260) (0.245)
[913,1009) 0.739∗∗∗ 0.21∗∗∗ 0.949∗∗∗ 0.651∗∗∗
(0.030) (0.041) (0.053) (0.111)
[1009,1778) −0.171∗∗ 0.095 -0.076 -0.011
(0.075) (0.097) (0.136) (0.314)
Wage Bill
[0,432) 65.76 −263.26∗∗∗ −197.49∗∗ -8.92
(10.36) (82.32) (83.25) ()
[432,913) −1811.33∗∗∗ 1823.32∗∗∗ −691.96∗∗∗ −490.15∗∗∗
(61.80) (159.21) (167.03) (18.81)
[913,1009) 686.43∗∗∗ 197.48∗∗∗ 800.91∗∗∗ 611.64∗∗∗
(28.60) (40.26) (51.16) (17.45)
[1009,1778) −185.44∗ 127.43 -58.01 1.31
(104.75) (129.68) (181.23) (22.80)
Cumulative Jobs Effect −1.955∗∗∗ 1.041∗∗ −0.914∗ -0.02
(0.141) (0.417) (0.472) (0.478)
∆ Jobs per Aff. Workers −0.148∗∗∗ 0.079∗∗ −0.069∗ 0.002
(0.011) (0.032) (0.036) (0.036)
Cumulative Pay Effect −1247.58∗∗∗ 1181.02∗∗∗ -66.55 113.89∗∗∗
(140.54) (282.02) (353.25) (17.45)
∆ Pay per Aff. Workers -94.59∗∗∗ 89.54∗∗∗ 5.05 8.63∗∗∗
(10.66) (21.38) (26.78) (1.32)
∆ Pay per Job Lost 73.13
()
%∆ Average Base Pay 0.014∗∗∗
(0.002)
Affected Workers 13.19 13.19 13.19 13.19
No. Jobs in [455,913) 13.19 65.76 78.95 10.84
Wage Bill in [455,913) $9,594.77 $42,130 $51,724.77 $7,923.89
Total No. Jobs 69.18 133.13 202.64 59.82
Number of Firms 58,584 58,584 58,584 58,584
Notes: First four rows of column (1) report the effect of the raising the OT threshold on the number of salaried workers in each
interval of base pay in December 2016, where the coefficients are sums of the bin-specific effects estimated from eq. 3. The next
four rows report the effect on the total base pay paid to workers in each interval of the salary distribution. Columns 2 reports
the analogous effects on the hourly distribution. Column (3) reports the effect of the policy on the pooled sample, computed as
the sum of columns (1) and (2). Column (4) reports the effect of the policy on the frequency distribution of workers who are
paid by salary in April 2016 and remain employed (as salaried or hourly) in December 2016.
The cumulative jobs effect is the sum of rows (1) to (4). The cumulative pay effect equals the sum of rows (5) to (8). “∆ Jobs
per Aff. Workers” and “∆ Pay per Aff. Workers” equal the cumulative jobs and cumulative pay effects divided by the number of
affected workers, respectively. “Affected workers” is the number of salaried workers in the average firm with base pay between
$455 and $913 in April 2016, whereas ”No. Jobs in [455,913)” is the number of workers in the subsample that satisfy those
conditions. “∆ Pay per Job Lost” equals the cumulative pay effect divided by the cumulative jobs effect. “%∆ Average Base
Pay” equals the cumulative pay effect divided by “Wage Bill in [455,913)”, which I define as the wage bill paid to the set of
workers in ”No. Jobs in [455,913)”. The second last row is the number of workers within the subsample in the average firm
in April 2016. The last row is the number of firms in the balanced panel of April and December 2016. Due to computational
difficulties, standard errors on the job effects in column (4) are unclustered, and the standard errors for the wage effects in
column (4) are clustered by firm assuming a constant correlation between firms. All other robust standard errors in parentheses
are clustered by firm, assuming independence across firms. ∗p < .1,∗∗ p < .05,∗∗∗ p < .01
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Table 2: Effect of Raising the OT Exemption Threshold on the Net Flow of Workers Into
the Salaried and Hourly Distributions
Salaried Distribution Reclassifications
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Employment Within Dist. Salaried Hourly Sum
Number of Jobs
[0,432) -0.054∗∗ -0.009 -0.025 0.066∗∗∗ 0.041∗∗
(0.027) (0.027) (0.017) (0.01) (0.017)
[432,913) −0.562∗∗∗ −0.606∗∗∗ −1.212∗∗∗ 1.016∗∗∗ −0.195∗∗∗
(0.039) (0.028) (0.062) (0.059) (0.022)
[913,1009) 0.154∗∗∗ 0.634∗∗∗ 0.016 0.099∗∗∗ 0.115∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.013) (0.013) (0.012) (0.009)
[1009,1778) 0.041 -0.024 −0.101∗∗∗ 0.143 0.042∗∗∗
(0.051) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.008)
Wage Bill
[0,432) −117.96∗∗∗ -1.47 -10.53 24.24∗∗∗ 13.72∗∗
(4.85) (2.29) (5.38) (2.91) (5.53)
[432,913) −488.26∗∗∗ −475.48∗∗∗ −875.08∗∗∗ 717.28∗∗∗ −157.80∗∗∗
(33.37) (19.63) (43.91) (39.71) (13.49)
[913,1009) 147.28∗∗∗ 596.60∗∗∗ 12.17 94.63∗∗∗ 106.80∗∗∗
(13.75) (20.66) (12.31) (11.15) (8.57)
[1009,1778) 56.273 -12.622 −115.87∗∗∗ 171.94∗∗∗ 56.07∗∗∗
(88.56) (24.34) (45.43) (47.36) (10.66)
Cumulative Jobs Effect −0.425∗∗∗ -0.005 −1.321∗∗∗ 1.324∗∗∗ 0.003
(0.082) (0.054) (0.082) (0.081) (0.009)
∆ Jobs per Aff. Workers −0.032∗∗∗ 0.000 −0.100∗∗∗ 0.100∗∗∗ 0.000
(0.006) (0.004) (0.006) (0.006) (0.001)
Cumulative Pay Effect −402.67∗∗∗ 107.13∗∗∗ −989.31∗∗∗ 1008.09∗∗∗ 18.79∗
(112.98) (19.89) (73.59) (71.21) (10.48)
∆ Pay per Aff. Workers -30.53∗∗∗ 8.12∗∗∗ -74.97∗∗∗ 76.42∗∗∗ 1.42∗
(8.57) (1.51) (5.58) (5.55) (0.79)
%∆ Average Base Pay 0.015∗∗∗ 0.014∗
(0.003) (0.008)
Affected Workers 13.19 13.19 13.19 13.19 13.19
No. Jobs in [455,913) 2.34 9.66 1.18 0.73 1.91
Wage Bill in [455,913) $1,664.43 $7,075.10 $848.79 $494.90 $1,354.56
Total No. Jobs 9.36 58.03 1.79 1.31 3.10
Number of Firms 58,584 58,584 58,584 58,584 58,584
Notes: The first four rows of columns (1)-(3) report the effect of raising the OT threshold on the net flow of workers into each
interval of the salaried distribution from unemployment, from within the salaried distribution, and from the hourly distribution
between April and December 2016. The next four rows show the change in the total base pay in each interval due to the above
flow effects. Column (4) reports analogous estimates on the effect of the policy on the flow of workers into the hourly distribution
from the salaried distribution. All the flow effects are sums of estimates from eq. ??. Column (5) reports the effect of the policy
on the pooled frequency distribution due to reclassifications, computed as the sum of columns (3) and (7).
The cumulative jobs effect is the sum of rows (1) to (4). The cumulative pay effect equals the sum of rows (5) to (8). “∆ Jobs
per Aff. Workers” and “∆ Pay per Aff. Workers” equal the cumulative jobs and cumulative pay effects divided by the number of
affected workers, respectively. “Affected workers” is the number of salaried workers in the average firm with base pay between
$455 and $913 in April 2016, whereas ”No. Jobs in [455,913)” is the number of workers in the subsample that satisfy those
conditions. “%∆ Average Base Pay” equals the cumulative pay effect divided by “Wage Bill in [455,913)”, which I define as
the wage bill paid to the set of workers in ”No. Jobs in [455,913)”. The second last row is the number of workers within the
subsample in the average firm in April 2016. The last row is the number of firms in the balanced panel of April and December
2016. Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered by firm. ∗p < .1,∗∗ p < .05,∗∗∗ p < .01
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Appendix A. Additional figures and tables
Appendix Figure A.1: Percent of Salaried Workers Below the FLSA OT Exemption Threshold
Notes: The figure shows the share of all salaried workers in the May extracts of the CPS who report
usual weekly earnings below the effective FLSA overtime exemption threshold from 1973 to 2017.
The threshold increased from $200 per week to $250 per week in January 1975, and then to $455 in
August 2004. The dotted blue line shows the percent of salaried workers with usual weekly earnings
below the $913 per week threshold announced in the 2016 policy.
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Appendix Figure A.2: Percent of Salaried Workers Eligible for Overtime
Notes: This figure shows the percent of salaried workers in the PSID who respond yes to the question
”If you were to work more hours than usual during some week, would you get paid for those extra
hours of work”.
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Appendix Figure A.3: Frequency Distribution of Salaried Workers by Month, Differenced by the Distribution in April 2015
Notes: The figure shows the frequency distribution of weekly base pays in each month of 2015, subtracted by the frequency distribution
in April 2015. For each month, I scale the distribution by the number of firms in the superset of all firms that appear in the data that
month and in April 2015. Within each graph, the bins are $20 wide except for the first bin which goes from $0 to $12.99. The vertical
black dashed line is at the bin containing $455, and the red dashed line is at the bin containing $913.
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Appendix Figure A.4: Frequency Distribution of Hourly Workers by Month, Differenced by the Distribution in April 2016
Notes: The figure shows the frequency distribution of weekly base pays of hourly workers in each month of 2016 and 2017, subtracted by
the frequency distribution in April 2016. For each month, I scale the distribution by the number of firms in the superset of all firms that
appear in the data that month and in April 2016. Within each graph, the bins are $20 wide except for the first bin which goes from $0
to $12.99. The vertical black dashed line is at the bin containing the overtime exemption threshold in April ($455), while the red dashed
line is at the bin containing the threshold ($913) that was supposed to go into effect on December 1, 2016.
52
Appendix Figure A.5: Effect of Raising the OT Threshold on the Number of SalariedWorkers,
$20 Bins
Notes: This figure shows the effect of the policy on the number of salaried workers in each $20 bin
in December 2016. The treatment effects are estiamted using equation 3. The solid blue line is the
running sum of these effects. The vertical black and red lines are at the old and new OT exemption
thresholds ($455 and $913), respectively.
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Appendix Figure A.6: Robustness of the Estimated Effects on the Frequency Distribution of Salaried Workers
(a) Robust to Bin Width of $20 (b) Robust to Relaxing γ’s
(c) Robust to Unbalanced Panel (d) Robust to Cutoff
Notes: Each figure presents the cumulative effect of raising the OT threshold in 2016 on the number of salaried workers up to that bin,
using a different sample or specification for each figure. Figure (a) estimates the bin-by-bin treatment effects for each year between 2012
and 2016 from equation 3 using a bin width of $20 per bin. The lines in figures (b), (c), and (d) were estimated using bins of width $96.15.
Figure (b) estimates the treatment effects without restricting γ1 = 1 and γ0=0 for bins smaller than $675. Figure (c) uses an unbalanced
panel whereby if a firm is missing in one month, its employment is coded as 0 in every bin. Each line in figure (d) is estimated using a
different cutoff j∗, where I use all bins j > j∗ to estimate the γ1 and γ0 in equation 3.
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Appendix Figure A.7: Placebo Tests of the Cumulative Effects on the Frequency Distribution of Hourly Workers
(a) Robust to Bin Width of $20 (b) Robust to Dropping MW States
(c) Robust to Unbalanced Panel (d) Robust to Cutoff
Notes: Each figure presents the cumulative effect of raising the OT threshold in 2016 on the number of hourly workers up to that bin,
using a different sample or specification for each figure. Figure (a) estimates the bin-by-bin treatment effects for each year between 2012
and 2016 from equation 3 using a bin width of $20 per bin. The lines in figures (b), (c), and (d) were estimated using bins of width
$96.15. Figure (b) estimates the treatment effects after dropping the 27 states with a state-specific minimum wage. Figure (c) uses an
unbalanced panel whereby if a firm is missing in one month, its employment is coded as 0 in every bin. Each line in figure (d) is estimated
using a different cutoff j∗, where I use all bins j > j∗ to estimate the γ1 and γ0 in equation 3.
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Appendix Figure A.8: Effect of Raising the OT Exemption Threshold on the Total Base Pay
within Each Bin of Salaried Workers’ Weekly Base Pay
(a) Estimates of the Effect on Total Base Pay of Salaried
Workers
(b) Placebo Test of Effect on Total Base Pay
Notes: Each bar in panel (a) shows the effect of the policy on the total base pay paid to salaried
workers in that $96.15 bin in Dec 2016. The treatment effects are estimated using equation 3, where
the outcome variable is total base pay. The solid blue line is the running sum of these effects. Panel
(b) shows the cumulative effect of raising the OT exemption threshold on the total base pay paid to
salaried workers in December of each year between 2012 and 2016. The solid blue line in panel (b)
is the same as the one in panel (a). The dotted graphs are similarly defined running sums, except
the effect of the policy is estimated using the December and April distributions of the labeled year
and the preceding adjacent year. In both graphs, the vertical black and red lines are at the start of
the bins that contain the old and new OT exemption thresholds ($455 and $913), respectively.
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Appendix Figure A.9: Effect of Raising the OT Exemption Threshold on the Total Base Pay
within Each Bin of Hourly Workers’ Weekly Base Pay
(a) Estimates of the Effect on Total Base Pay of Hourly
Workers
(b) Placebo Test of Effect on Total Base Pay
Notes: Each bar in panel (a) shows the effect of the policy on the total base pay paid to hourly
workers in that $96.15 bin in Dec 2016. The treatment effects are estimated using equation 3, where
the outcome variable is total base pay. The solid blue line is the running sum of these effects. Panel
(b) shows the cumulative effect of raising the OT exemption threshold on the total base pay paid
to hourly workers in December of each year between 2012 and 2016. The solid blue line in panel (b)
is the same as the one in panel (a). The dotted graphs are similarly defined running sums, except
the effect of the policy is estimated using the December and April distributions of the labeled year
and the preceding adjacent year. In both graphs, the vertical black and red lines are at the start of
the bins that contain the old and new OT exemption thresholds ($455 and $913), respectively.
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Appendix Figure A.10: Analysis of the Employment Flows into the Salaried Distribution
(a) Distribution of Net Employment by Year
(b) Placebo Test of the Net Employment Effect
Notes: Figure (a) shows the frequency distribution of net flows into the salaried distribution from
unemployment, between April and December of each year. For each year, the corresponding graph
is equal to the difference between the distribution of new hires and the the distribution of sepa-
rations. Figure (b) estimates the cumulative effect of the OT exemption threshold policy on the
net employment flows of each year between 2012 and 2016. The effect at each bin is estimated via
equation ?? and the lines are the sum of the running sum of the effects across bins.
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Appendix Figure A.11: Analysis of Reclassifications in and out of the Salaried Distribution
(a) Distribution of Net Reclassifications by Year
(b) Placebo Test of Net Reclassification Effects
Notes: Figure (a) shows the distribution of net flows into the salaried distribution from the hourly
distribution, between April and December of each year. For each year, the corresponding graph is
equal to the difference between the distribution of salaried workers in April who become hourly in
December, and the distribution of salaried workers in December who were hourly in April. Figure
(b) estimates the cumulative effect of the OT exemption threshold policy on the net reclassification
flows of each year between 2012 and 2016. The effect at each bin is estimated via equation ?? and
the lines are the sum of the running sum of the effects across bins.
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Appendix Figure A.12: Analysis of Flows Within the Salaried Distribution Between April
and December
(a) Distribution of Flows Within Salaried Distribution
(b) Placebo Test of the Effect Within Salaried Distribution
Notes: Figure (a) shows the net flow into each bin of the salaried distribution from all other bins
in the salaried distribution, between April and December of each year. Figure (b) estimates the
cumulative effect of the OT exemption threshold policy on the net flow of workers within the
salaried distribution of each year between 2012 and 2016. The effect at each bin is estimated via
equation ?? and the lines are the sum of the running sum of the effects across bins.
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Appendix Figure A.13: Analysis of the Employment Flows into the Hourly Distribution
(a) Separations Between April and December (b) New Hires Between April and December
(c) Distribution of Net Employment by Year (d) Placebo Test of the Net Employment Effect
Notes: Figure (a) shows the distribution of separations from the hourly distribution between April and December of each year. Figure
(b) shows the distribution of new hires into the hourly distribution between April and December of each year. Figure (c) shows the
distribution of net flows into the hourly distribution from unemployment, between April and December of each year. It is equal to the
difference between figures (b) and (a). Figure (d) estimates the cumulative effect of the OT exemption threshold policy on the net
employment flows of each year between 2012 and 2016. The effect at each bin is estimated via equation ?? and the lines are the sum of
the running sum of the effects across bins.
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Appendix Figure A.14: Analysis of Reclassifications in and out of the Hourly Distribution
(a) Reclassifications from Hourly to Salaried (b) Reclassifications from Salaried to Hourly
(c) Distribution of Net Reclassifications by Year (d) Placebo Test of Net Reclassification Effects
Notes: Figure (d) shows the distribution of reclassifications out of the hourly distribution between April and December of each year.
Figure (b) shows the distribution of reclassifications into the hourly distribution between April and December of each year. Figure (c)
shows the distribution of net flows into the hourly distribution from the salaried distribution, between April and December of each year.
It is equal to the difference between figures (b) and (a). Figure (d) estimates the cumulative effect of the OT exemption threshold policy
on the net reclassification flows of each year between 2012 and 2016. The effect at each bin is estimated via equation ?? and the lines
are the sum of the running sum of the effects across bins.
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Appendix Figure A.15: Analysis of Flows Within the Hourly Distribution Between April and
December
(a) Distribution of Flows Within Hourly Distribution
(b) Placebo Test of the Effect Within Hourly Distribution
Notes: Figure (a) shows the net flow into each bin of the hourly distribution from all other bins
in the hourly distribution, between April and December of each year. Figure (b) estimates the
cumulative effect of the OT exemption threshold policy on the net flow of workers within the
hourly distribution of each year between 2012 and 2016. The effect at each bin is estimated via
equation ?? and the lines are the running sum of the effects across bins.
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Appendix B. History of the 2016 FLSA Policy
The first public announcement of the Department of Labor’s intent to update the FLSA
overtime exemption threshold occurred on March 13, 2014. After identifying problems with
the existing threshold, President Obama declared “I’m directing Tom Perez, my Secretary
of Labor, to restore the common-sense principle behind overtime... we’re going to consult
with both workers and businesses as we update our overtime rules” (White House Archives
- March 13, 2014). The reaction from the press was that “Mr. Obama’s decision to use his
executive authority to change the nation’s overtime rules is likely to be seen as a challenge
to Republicans in Congress, who have already blocked most of the president’s economic
agenda” (NYT March 14, 2014). However, while there was an expectation of resistance from
Congress, Google search trends suggest that the FLSA overtime exemption policy did not
receive much attention from the public at this time (see figure B.1).
Appendix Figure B.1: Google Search Popularity for the Term “FLSA Overtime”
Notes: This figure shows the relative popularity of “FLSA Overtime” as a Google search term
between January 2013 and January 2020. A value of 100 indicates its highest popularity level, and
the measure of popularity is scaled proportional to this instance.
Interest in the the FLSA grew in 2015 following the DOL’s announcement on June 26th
that it would like to “raise the threshold under which most salaried workers are guaranteed
overtime to equal the 40th percentile of weekly earnings for full-time salaried workers. As
proposed, this would raise the salary threshold from $455 a week ($23,660 a year) – below the
poverty threshold for a family of four – to a projected level of $970 a week ($50,440 a year)
in 2016” (White House Archives June 30, 2015). Consistent with the normal rulemaking
process, the Department of Labor stated that it would release a finalized rule the next year
after reviewing comments from the public regarding its current proposal. Similar to the initial
announcement in 2014, new articles at the time believed that the policy would face challenges
in the courts (NYT June 30, 2015). There were also some reports that companies were already
investing in new software to comply with the policy (WSJ Jul 21, 2015), though I do not
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observe any evidence of this adjustment in the data (compare the difference-distributions in
figure 2b).
The finalized threshold of $913 per week was announced on May 18, 2016, and was set
to go into effect on December 1, 2016 with automatic updating every three years to ad-
just for inflation.46 This announcement received considerable attention from employers, as
evident from the spike in Google searches for “FLSA Overtime”. In response to the new
regulation, “Republican lawmakers, who are close to many of the industries that oppose the
new rule, have vowed to block it during a mandated congressional review period”. However,
given Donald Trump’s presidential campaign, there was an understanding that repealing the
regulation would be a risky political move for the Republican party as it “could exacerbate
an already palpable split between Mr. Trump’s blue-collar supporters and the party’s estab-
lishment donors and politicians” (NYT May 18, 2016). Hence, it was not clear at this point
that the rule would be repealed.
On September 20, 2016, twenty-one States sued the Department of Labor in federal court
in Sherman, Texas. They argued that the new regulation should be nullified for two reasons.
First, they claimed that “the FLSA’s overtime requirements violate the Constitution by
regulating the States and coercing them to adopt wage policy choices that adversely affect
the States’ priorities, budgets, and services”. Second, the states argued that the magnitude
of the proposed overtime exemption threshold conflicted with Congress’ original intent in
the FLSA to exempt “any employee employed in a bona fide executive, administrative, or
professional capacity” (State of Nevada et al v. United States Department of Labor et al,
Filing 60). While the DOL has historically used both a duties test and a salary test to define
these occupations, the States argued that the language of the text indicates that Congress
intended for a duties test to be the primary determinant of overtime exemption status, and
a salary threshold of $913 effectively supplants the duties test. Under the Chevron deference
principle, the new rule would therefore exceed the power given to the Department of Labor
by Congress.
Given the lack of media coverage over the court proceedings, it came as a surprise to
employers when Judge Amos L. Mazzant III placed a preliminary injunction on the new
overtime exemption threshold on November 22, 2016, after agreeing with the plaintiffs’ second
argument. From a review of newspaper articles at the time, I find no reports on the court
46The final rule also raised the threshold for “highly compensated employees” from $100,000 per
year to $134,004. Workers above this threshold are subject to a less stringent duties test to be
exempt from overtime. I do not find any bunching in response to this component of the policy.
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case in the Wall Street Journal or New York Times between the date of the initial court
filing and the date of the injunction. While I do find mentions of the lawsuit as part of
broader news on the FLSA overtime exemption threshold, none go into any more detail than
stating that a case is under way (eg. USA Today Oct. 12, 2016). Consistent with the lack of
awareness of the appeal against the new overtime exemption threshold, I see no increase in
Google traffic for the term “FLSA Overtime” in September when the initial case was filed,
but a large spike in November after its injunction.
Even among individuals aware of the lawsuit, there was the belief that employers should
be ready for the December 1st deadline. For example, a story by the Washington Post quoted
a senior executive at the National Federation of Independent Business that “employers can’t
count on a reprieve, and playing chicken with the Dec. 1 deadline ‘could be a very expensive
mistake”’ (Washington Post Oct 20, 2016). Similarly, an attorney interviewed by the Society
of Human Resource Management stated that “although it’s possible,... employers shouldn’t
expect a miracle before the Dec. 1 implementation deadline.” (SHRM Oct 21, 2016). Overall,
there is no indication that employers expected the injunction.
Since employers did not foresee the injunction, many had already implemented changes
in anticipation of the policy or followed through with their promises to their workers. For
instance, Wal-Mart and Kroger both raised their managers’ salaries above the new overtime
exemption threshold and did not retract them after the injunction (WSJ Dec 20, 2016). On
the other hand, Burger King announced that it would defer its initial plan to convert its
salaried manager to hourly in light of the injunction Slate Jan 16, 2017]. Aside from retail
and fast food restaurants, anecdotally, the policy also had a large effect on institutions of
higher education. The National Institutes of Health (NIH) and many large universities also
gave their post-docs raises above the proposed overtime exemption threshold (Science Jan 4,
2017). On the other hand, some institutions such as the University of Maryland and Arizona
State University retracted their promises to either pay their employees overtime or increase
their salaries (Huffpost June 7, 2017).
Following the preliminary injunction, there was a general belief from judge Mazzant’s
language that the $913 exemption threshold would not survive. However, it was uncertain
how long the judicial process would take and whether the new Trump administration would
propose a smaller increase to the overtime exemption threshold (NYT Nov 22, 2016). It
became clearer that the new administration had no desire to defend the overtime policy in
courts after the nomination of fast-food executive, and critic of overtime regulation, Andrew
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Puzder as Labor Secretary on December 8, 2016 (Forbes March 18, 2016). In the end, Andrew
Puzder did not receive enough support from the Senate for his confirmation on February 15,
2016 and the position ultimately went to Alexander Acosta. Nevertheless, Acosta reaffirmed
employers’ priors that the overtime threshold proposed by Obama would never go into effect.
When asked about the overtime exemption threshold during his confirmation hearing on
March 22, 2017, Acosta stated that “if you were to apply a straight inflation adjustment, I
believe the figure if it were updated would be somewhere around $33,000”. The Department
of Labor officially dropped its defense of the $913 threshold in June 2017.
After the DOL abandoned its defense of the $913 threshold in June 2017, they submitted
a new Request for Information on July 27 (DOL June 27, 2017), allowing the public an
opportunity to submit their opinions of the overtime exemption threshold. In December
2017, the DOL announced that it plans to propose a new threshold by October 2018, and
most employers believed that it would be within the $30,000-35,000 per year range SHRM
March 2018. The DOL officially proposed a new threshold of $679 per week ($35,308 per
year) on March 7, 2019. After a period of public comments, on September 24, 2019, the DOL
finalized the new threshold at $684 per week. This new threshold went into effect on January
1, 2020 without as much coverage as the 2016 policy (see figure B.1).
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Appendix C. Derivation of the Conceptual Framework
C.1 Solving the baseline model
The worker’s utility from employment and searching are characterized by the following Bell-
man equations:
(r + δ)Ve(w, h) = w − a
− 1
ǫ
h1+
1
ǫ
1 + 1
ǫ
+ δVn
rVn = b+ λ
∫
Ve(θ,F )≥Vn
[Ve(w(θ, F ), h(θ, F ))− Vn]dG(θ, F )
The firm’s present value of profits is given by
J =
θhβ − w + F · sgn(S)
r + δ
I want to express w0, h0, S0, θ
∗
0, and Vn in terms of (θ, a, F ) and model primitives. First,
rearrange the worker’s Bellman equation for the value of employment as
Ve(w, h)− Vn =
w − a−
1
ǫ
h1+
1
ǫ
1+ 1
ǫ
− rVn
r + δ
(6)
Substitute (6) into the Nash bargaining problem and take first order conditions:
(w0, h0, S0) = arg max
(w,h,S)
[Ve(w, h)− Vn]
α
[θhβ − w + F · sgn(S)
r + δ
]1−α
FOCw = α[h
βθ − w − FS]− (1− α)[w − a
− 1
ǫ
h1+
1
ǫ
1 + 1
ǫ
− rVn] (7)
FOCh = −αa
− 1
ǫh
1
ǫ (hβθ − w − FS) + (1− α)βh
β−1θ(w − a−
1
ǫ
h1+
1
ǫ
1 + 1
ǫ
− rVn) (8)
Rearrange (7) for w0, then substitute w0 into (8) to solve for h0. S0 is simply the corner
solution that maximizes the Nash product.
w0 = α
(
θh
β
0 + F · sgn(S0)
)
+ (1− α)
(
a−
1
ǫ
h
1+ 1
ǫ
0
1 + 1
ǫ
+ rVn
)
h0 =
(
a
1
ǫβθ
) 1
1+1ǫ−β
S0 = arg max
S∈{−1,1}
F · sgn(S)
68
Note that at h0,
∂J
∂h
= ∂Ve(w,h)
∂h
. In other words, h0 maximizes the total surplus of the employ-
ment relationship. To solve for θ∗0(a, F ), substitute (w0, h0) into (6) and solve for the value
of θ such that the expression equals 0.
Ve(w0, h0)− Vn = 0 ⇔
w0 − a
− 1
ǫ
h
1+ 1
ǫ
0
1 + 1
ǫ
− rVn = 0 ⇔
α
(
θh
β
0 + F · sgn(S0)− a
− 1
ǫ
h
1+ 1
ǫ
0
1 + 1
ǫ
− rVn
)
= 0 ⇔
θ∗0 =
[
rVn − αFS
(a
1
ǫβ)
β
1+1ǫ−β (1− β
1+ 1
ǫ
)
] 1+1ǫ−β
1+1ǫ
Note from the third line that at θ∗0, the total surplus of the employment relationship equals
0. I will use this property when computing the comparative statics. Lastly, from the Bellman
equation representing the worker’s value of searching, I numerically solve for Vn
rVn = b+ λ
∫
Ve(θ,F )≥Vn
[Ve(w(θ, F ), h(θ, F ))− Vn]dG(θ, F )
= b+ λ
∫
θ≥θ∗0(F,Vn),F
[w0(θ, F, Vn)− a− 1ǫ h0(θ,Vn)1+1ǫ1+ 1
ǫ
− rVn
r + δ
]
dG(θ, F )
C.2 Solving the model with overtime
Case 1: No Monitoring Costs or Wage Rigidities
Given job characteristics (w, h, S), the firm’s profit is given by
J =
θhβ − (1 + η(w,h,S))w + F · sgn(S)
r + δ
where
η(w,h,S) =


0.5(h−40)
40
if h > 40 and S = −1
1.5(h−40)
40
if h > 40, S = 1, and w < w¯
0 otherwise
(9)
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The worker’s value of employment follows
(r + δ)Ve(w, h) = (1 + η(w,h,S))w − a
− 1
ǫ
h1+
1
ǫ
1 + 1
ǫ
+ δVn
Following the same steps as in the model without overtime, I solve the Nash bargaining
problem
(w1, h1, S1) = arg max
(w,h,S)
[Ve(w, h)− Vn]
α
[θhβ − (1 + η(w,h,S))w + F · sgn(S)
r + δ
]1−α
FOCw = α[h
βθ − (1 + η)w − FS]− (1− α)[(1 + η)w − a
− 1
ǫ
h1+
1
ǫ
1 + 1
ǫ
− rVn] (10)
FOCh = −αa
−
1
ǫ h
1
ǫ
(
hβθ − (1 + η)w − FS
)
+ (1− α)βhβ−1θ
(
(1 + η)w − a−
1
ǫ
h1+
1
ǫ
1 + 1
ǫ
− rVn
)
(11)
The Nash bargaining solution is
w1 =
1
1 + η(w,h,S)
[
α
(
θh
β
1 + F · sgn(S1)
)
+ (1− α)
(
a−
1
ǫ
h
1+ 1
ǫ
1
1 + 1
ǫ
+ rVn
)]
h1 =
(
a
1
ǫβθ
) 1
1+1ǫ−β
S1 = arg max
S∈{−1,1}
F · sgn(S)
Notice that h1 = h0, S1 = S0, and (1 + η(w,h,S))w1 = w0. In other words, gross pay, weekly
hours, and pay classification all remain the same. By extension, θ∗ and Vn are the same as
in the baseline model.
Case 2: Monitoring Costs
Given job characteristics (w, h, S), the firm’s profit is given by
J =
θhβ − (1 + η(w,h,S))w + F · sgn(S)− C · 1[S = 1, w < w¯]
r + δ
where C is a constant and 1[S = 1, w < w¯] is an indicator that equals 1 if S = 1 and w < w¯.
The worker’s value of employment and search follow the same formulation as case 1. To solve
the Nash bargaining problem, I need to compare the Nash product of the interior solution
and the corner solution where w2 = w¯.
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Interior solution:
w2 =
1
1 + η(w,h,S)
[
α
(
θh
β
1 + FS − C1[S=1,w<w¯]
)
+ (1− α)
(
a−
1
ǫ
h
1+ 1
ǫ
0
1 + 1
ǫ
+ rV OTn
)]
h2 =
(
a
1
ǫβθ
) 1
1+1ǫ−β
S2 = arg max
S∈{−1,1}
FS − C1[S=1,w<w¯]
where V OTn is the value of unemployment given the overtime policy.
Corner solution:
w2 = w¯
h2 solves FOCh|w=w¯ = 0
FOCh|h=h0,w=w¯ = a
− 1
ǫh
1
ǫ
0 [w¯ − w0] > 0
S2 = 1
All salaried jobs with w0 ≥ w¯ and all hourly jobs are unaffected by the monitoring cost
C. As such, the hours of these jobs are equivalent to that in case 1, and earnings is likewise
similar except for an adjustment of (1 − α)(rV OTn − rVn). For salaried workers with base
incomes less than the overtime exemption threshold, one of three outcomes can occur:
1. Interior solution, where F > 0 and 2F − C < 0. This implies that without over-
time, the job is salaried S0 = 1, but with overtime, it becomes reclassified as hourly
S2 = −1. The hours remain constant h2 = h0, but the base income becomes w2 =
w0−2αF+(1−α)r(V OTn −Vn)
1+η(w,h,S)
, and gross income g = (1+η)w2 = w0−2αF+(1−α)r(V
OT
n −Vn).
2. Interior solution, where 2F −C ≥ 0. The job’s salaried status and hours are the same
as in a world without overtime (h2, S2) = (h0, S0). However, base income decreases to
w2 =
w0−αC+(1−α)r(V OTn −Vn)
1+η(w,h,S)
, and gross income to g = w0 − αC + (1− α)r(V
OT
n − Vn).
3. Corner solution. This creates bunching in the base income distribution of salaried
workers. Weekly hours cannot be expressed as a closed form solution, but by evaluating
the first order condition at w = w¯ and h = h0, I show that weekly hours should increase
relative to the baseline scenario, and to a first order approximation, the increase in
hours is proportional to the increase in income.
The sign and magnitude of V OTn −VN for a given worker type a depends on the distribution
of (θ, F ) and the proportion of workers affected by each of the above three responses. From
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the worker’s Bellman equation, one can express V OTn − VN as:
[
r + δ
λ
+ σ(Φunaff ) + α(σ(Φrec) + σ(Φcov)) + σ(Φbun)]r(V
OT
n − VN)]
= −
∫
Φrec
2αFdG−
∫
Φcov
αCdG+
∫
Φbun
(w¯ − w0)−
a−
1
ǫ
1 + 1
ǫ
(h
1+ 1
ǫ
2 − h
1+ 1
ǫ
0 )dG+
∫
Φemp
∆V dG
where σ is a measure, Φunaff = {(θ, F )|w0 ≥ w¯ or S0 = −1} is the set of jobs not directly
affected by the overtime exemption threshold. Similarly, Φrec is the set of jobs that are
reclassified, Φcov is the set of jobs that gain coverage, Φbun is the set of jobs that get bunched,
and Φemp is the set of matches that become jobs in only one of the two scenarios. ∆V is the
difference between the value of employment and unemployment. Abstracting away from the
last term, if all workers are reclassified or gain coverage, then V OTn − VN < 0 since workers
do not value their pay classification but the added cost to the employer reduces workers’
earnings. On the other hand, if all workers are bunched, then V OTn − VN is positive if and
only if workers value the increase in earnings more than the loss in leisure. To simplify the
subsequent discussion, I assume V OTn −Vn = 0, though the predictions hold for a wider range
of values.
To determine whether an interior or corner solution solves the Nash bargaining problem
for a given (θ, F, a), I compare the Nash products between the two solutions.
NP =
1
r + δ
[(1 + η)w2 − a
− 1
ǫ
h
1+ 1
ǫ
2
1 + 1
ǫ
− rV OTn ]
α
[
θh
β
2 − (1 + η)w2 + FS − C1[S=1,w<w¯]
]1−α
Without a closed form for h2 in the corner solution, one cannot directly compare the two
quantities. However, I can predict when the corner solution is more likely to be the optimum
given the baseline income w0. Notice that at the corner solution, the Nash product simplifies
to
NPcorner =
1
r + δ
[w¯ − a−
1
ǫ
h
1+ 1
ǫ
2
1 + 1
ǫ
− rV OTn ]
α
[
θh
β
2 − w¯ + F
]1−α
From the first order condition that determines h2, I know that the optimal hours with
monitoring costs approaches the optimal hours in the baseline case as the baseline income
approaches the overtime threshold (i.e. limw0→w¯ h2 = h0). Assuming V
OT
n = Vn, this implies
that NPcorner → NP0 as w0 → w¯, where NP0 is the Nash product in the baseline case. Since
NP0 ≥ NP for every (θ, F, a), it is the case that for each (θ, F, a), there exists a ε such that
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NPcorner ≥ NPinterior for every w0 ∈ {w0|w¯−w0 < ε}.
47 In other words, jobs initially paying
close to the threshold are more likely to be bunched.
Given the Nash bargaining solutions, do more or fewer matches get accepted and become
employment relative to the benchmark case without overtime? Recall that in the benchmark
case, given a (a, F ), all matches with quality greater than or equal to θ∗0(a, F ) are accepted.
Furthermore, the total surplus at θ∗0 equaled zero:
θ∗0h
β
0 + F · sgn(S0)− a
− 1
ǫ
h
1+ 1
ǫ
0
1 + 1
ǫ
− rVn = 0
where h0 =
(
a
1
ǫβθ∗0
) 1
1+1ǫ−β and S0 maximizes the surplus. Given parameters (θ
∗
0, a, F ) such
that S0 = 1 and w < w¯, consider how the total surplus with overtime and monitoring costs
(TSOT ) compare to the total surplus in the benchmark case (TS0 = 0):
1. If the job is reclassified, then TSOT = TS0 − 2F − r(V
OT
n − Vn)
2. If the job remains salaried but not bunched, then TSOT = TS0 − C − r(V
OT
n − Vn)
3. If the job is bunched, then TSOT = TS0+θ
∗
0(h
β
2−h
β
0 )−a
− 1
ǫ (
h
1+1ǫ
2
1+ 1
ǫ
−
h
1+1ǫ
0
1+ 1
ǫ
)−r(V OTn −Vn)
If r(V OTn − Vn) ≥ 0, then it must be that TS > TS0.
48 A negative match surplus implies
that if the job is agreed upon, then either the firm will receive negative profits or the value
of searching exceeds the value of the job. Thus, jobs with negative surplus are not accepted.
Since the total surplus is monotonically increasing with respect to θ, for each (a, F ), there
exists a θˆ > θ∗0 such that matches are accepted if and only if θ ≥ θˆ.
Case 3: Downward Nominal Wage Rigidity
For the case with downward nominal wage rigidity, it is instructive to study the effects of im-
posing overtime on hourly and salaried workers in sequence. First, suppose all hourly workers
are covered for overtime, and firms cannot offer a wage, w
h
, lower than in the benchmark case.
The Nash bargaining problem is
(w3, h3, S3) = arg max
(w,h,S)
[Ve(w, h)− Vn]
α
[θhβ − (1 + η(w,h,S))w + F · sgn(S)
r + δ
]1−α
47If V OTn 6= Vn, then NPcorner → NPmax as w0 → w¯ − (1 − α)r(V
OT
n − Vn), where NPmax ≥ NP
for every every (θ, F, a). NPmax is the solution to the benchmark Nash bargaining problem with
no monitoring cost, assuming a search value of V OTn .
48The inequality is true for the third line since h0 maximizes θh
β − a−
1
ǫ
h1+
1
ǫ
1+ 1
ǫ
.
73
where
η(w,h,S) =


0.5(h−40)
40
if h > 40 and S = −1
0 otherwise
(12)
and w
h
≥ w0
h0
if S = −1.
Since the overtime policy only affects hourly workers working above 40 hours, it has no
effect on the job characteristics of matches (θ, F, a) that do not meet this criteria in the
benchmark case, aside from the indirect effect of changes to the value of continued search,
Vn. For matches where S0 = −1 and h0 > 40, the bargaining solution can either adjust along
the hours margin (interior solution) or the salaried/hourly margin (corner solution).
The corner solution sets S3 = 1, and solves for (w3, h3). The solution to the Nash bar-
gaining problem is similar to that of case 1:
w3 =
1
1 + η(w,h,S)
[
α
(
θh
β
3 − F
)
+ (1− α)
(
a−
1
ǫ
h
1+ 1
ǫ
3
1 + 1
ǫ
+ rVn
)]
h3 =
(
a
1
ǫβθ
) 1
1+1ǫ−β
This solution is optimal for matches where the relative cost to being salaried, F , is small.
To solve for the interior solution of (w3, h3, S3), substitute w =
w0
h0
h into the Nash bar-
gaining problem and take first order conditions with respect to h:
FOCh = α(1.5
w0
h0
− a−
1
ǫh
1
ǫ )[θhβ − (1.5−
20
h
)
w0
h0
h− FS]
+ (1− α)(θβhβ−1 − 1.5
w0
h0
)[(1.5−
20
h
)
w0
h0
h− a−
1
ǫ
h
1+ 1
ǫ
0
1 + 1
ǫ
− rVn]
Although there is no closed form solution for h3, I can determine whether h3 is larger or
smaller relative to the case without overtime by evaluating the first order condition at h0,
recalling that a−
1
ǫh
1
ǫ
0 = θβh
β−1
0 :
FOCh|h=h0 = (1.5
w0
h0
− θβhβ−10 )︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0 if β<1.5α
(
20
h0
− 0.5)︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0 since h0>40
w0︸︷︷︸
>0
Substituting in w0, I show that β < 1.5α is a sufficient condition for the first order condition
to be negative. Intuitively, the overtime premium raises the income of the worker, so the firm
is able to demand longer hours. However, if the worker receives a sufficiently large portion
of the surplus relative to the gain in production, then the firm would rather decrease hours
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to reduce costs.
Assuming that β < 1.5α, the model predicts a spike at 40 hours per week among hourly
workers. Since this model relies on wages being downward rigid, one might expect there to be
a higher propensity to bunch among minimum wage workers. In addition, the model predicts
that some jobs will be reclassified from hourly to salaried. Following the same argument in
case 2, some matches will also fail to become employment.
Next, I extend overtime coverage to salaried workers with weekly base incomes less than
an overtime exemption threshold w¯. I introduce “wage” rigidity by restricting salaried work-
ers’ weekly base pay to be greater than or equal to the agreed upon amount in the benchmark
scenario (i.e. w3 ≥ w0). Following the same argument as above, weekly hours decreases for
covered salaried workers if β < 1.5α. Similar to the argument in case 2, the Nash product
for individuals initially earning just below the threshold (w¯ − w0 is small) is maximized by
bunching their weekly income at the threshold. Without a fixed monitoring cost though, the
bunching in hour and weekly income only affects salaried workers who are initially working
over 40 hours per week (h0 > 40). If reducing hours or increasing base income results in a
negative surplus, the job is dissolved.
In contrast to case 2, there are no longer any incentives to reclassify workers who are
salaried in the benchmark case (S0 = 1) since the costs of overtime are the same regardless of
their classification. However, given that salaried workers gain coverage after hourly workers,
the comparative statics should be made relative to the scenario where only hourly workers
are eligible for overtime. In that case, workers who are salaried as a result of the asymmetric
overtime costs (S0 = −1 and S3 = 1) will be reclassified back to hourly status with shorter
hours, or bunched at the threshold, or unemployed. I expect to observe this reclassification
effect only for workers earning below the overtime exemption threshold. The asymmetric
overtime costs for those above the threshold still incentivizes firms to reclassify hourly workers
as salaried.
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Appendix D. Normalizing Compensation Variables
D.1 Base Pay and Gross Pay
While the measure of base pay that the Department of Labor uses to determine overtime
eligibility is denominated at the weekly level, workers’ standard rate of pay is recorded at
the paycheck level and their gross pay is calculated at the monthly level. In this section, I
explain the procedure I use to normalize these two key measures of compensation in the data
to the weekly level. Table D.1 shows the share of workers with each pay frequency in April
2016, and the formula used to compute their base pay and gross pay.
Appendix Table D.1: Normalizing Compensation to Weekly Level, by Pay Frequency
Share of Workers
Pay Frequency Hourly Salaried Standard Pay Gross Pay
Weekly 0.24 0.06 S 1
N
Y
Biweekly 0.66 0.53 1
2
S 1
2N
Y
Semimonthly 0.09 0.35 24
52
S 12
52
Y
Monthly 0.01 0.06 12
52
S 12
52
Y
All workers 0.66 0.34
Notes: The first column shows the four frequencies at which individuals can receive their paycheck.
Columns 2 and 3 show the share of hourly and salaried workers with each pay frequency, respectively,
in April 2016 who are paid according to each pay frequency. Column 4 shows the formula to
normalize salaried workers’ standard rate of pay, denoted by S, to weekly base pay for each pay
frequency. Column 5 shows the formula to normalize monthly gross pay, denoted by Y , to an average
weekly gross pay conditional on receiving N paychecks in the month.
To derive workers’ weekly base pay from their standard rate of pay, I follow the rules
set by the Department of Labor and scale each worker’s standard rate of pay by their pay
frequency (i.e. standard pay
week
= standard pay
paycheck
· paycheck
weeks
). For workers paid weekly or biweekly, I simply
multiply the standard rate of pay by 1 and 0.5, respectively, to compute their weekly base
pay. For workers paid semimonthly or monthly, the DOL’s formula makes the approximation
that each month is 1/12 of the year and each year has 52 weeks. Thus, weekly base pay
equals standard rate of pay times 24
52
for workers paid semimonthly, and standard rate of pay
times 12
52
for workers paid monthly.
To express the gross pay variable at the weekly level, I normalize it by the number of
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paychecks they receive each month and the number of weeks covered per paycheck.
gross pay
week
=
gross pay
month
/(paychecks
month
·
weeks
paycheck
)
The normalization is simple for workers paid monthly or semimonthly. By definition, paychecks
month
=
1 for workers paid monthly and paychecks
month
= 2 for workers paid semimonthly. For all workers,
the term paycheck
weeks
is equivalent to the scaling factor used to translate the standard rate of pay
to weekly base pay.
The challenge is to impute the number of paychecks that each weekly and biweekly paid
worker receives each month. For a given worker-month, this depends on both the day of the
week that the worker gets paid, and the number of times that day appears in the month.
For instance, if a worker gets paid on a Thursday every two weeks, then the worker’s gross
pay may include 3 paychecks in December 2016 when there were 5 Thursdays, but only 2
paychecks in April 2016. To illustrate this problem, I plot in figure D.1a the monthly gross
pay for a balanced panel of workers who earn between $455 and $913 base pay in April 2016,
by their pay frequency. Not only do biweekly and weekly paid workers experience spikes in
their gross pay, the peaks and troughs do not occur on the same months between years. In
contrast, monthly and semi-monthly paid workers only experience a large spike in December
of each year, likely reflecting bonuses.
While different workers may receive an extra paycheck in different months, employees
of the same firm tend to receive a paycheck on the same day of the month, conditional on
their pay frequency. To impute the number of paychecks per month that each firm issues in
a month, I apply the following algorithm:
1. Compute the average gross pay across all workers of the same pay frequency within
each firm-month.
2. Within each year, for each firm-frequency, compute the median of the average gross
pays across the 12 months.
3. I record biweekly workers as receiving 3 paychecks in months where the average gross
pay in their firm-frequency exceeds 1.2 times the firm’s median gross pay in that year,
and 2 otherwise.
4. I record weekly workers as receiving 5 paychecks in months where the average gross
pay in their firm-frequency exceeds 1.075 time the firm’s median gross pay in that year,
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and 4 otherwise.
By computing the number of paychecks at the firm level, I can impute the number of pay-
checks received by workers who are only employed for a few months. Plotting workers’ gross
pay, normalized to a weekly level using their imputed number of paychecks, I show in figure
D.1b that the periodic spikes in gross pay among biweekly and weekly paid workers disap-
pear. While a spike remains in December, reflecting real increases pay at the end of the year,
since this occurs every year, it does not affect my empirical analysis which relies on between
year comparisons.
Appendix Figure D.1: Gross Income, by Pay Frequency
(a) Monthly Gross Pay (b) Normalized Weekly Gross Pay
Notes: Panel (a) shows the average monthly gross pay for a balanced panel of workers who earned
between $455 and $913 per week in April 2016. The pay frequencies from left to right are biweekly,
monthly, semi-monthly, and weekly. Panel (b) shows the normalized weekly gross pay for the same
panel of workers.
To validate the imputation exercise, I compare the imputed number of paychecks per
month to the actual number of paychecks per month, which is recorded from 2016 onwards
(see figure D.2). I find that I am able to match the actual number of paychecks for nearly
90% of biweekly paid worker-months and 80% of weekly paid worker-months.
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Appendix Figure D.2: Impute Number of Pay Checks, by Pay Frequency
(a) Biweekly (b) Weekly
Notes: Panel (a) shows distribution of the difference between imputed and actual number of pay-
checks per month, for all worker-months in 2016 where the worker is paid biweekly. Panel (b) shows
a similar distribution for workers who are paid weekly.
D.2 Overtime Pay
There are two challenges to inferring workers’ overtime pay from the ADP data. First,
firms are not required to input a value into the “OT earnings” variable. Although the ADP
data contains four separate earnings variables and four corresponding hours variables, each
capturing a different component of gross compensation, firms are only required to report
employees’ gross pay and standard rate of pay. Thus, it is uncertain whether a missing “OT
earnings” means the firm does not record the value or the worker did not receive any overtime
pay. I find that “OT earnings” is non-missing (non-zero) for 45% (X%) of hourly workers and
3.5% (Y%) of salaried workers in April 2016. The second challenge with measuring workers’
overtime pay is that the type of compensation included into the “OT earnings” variable is
at the discretion of the firm. For example, while one firm may use the variable to record
overtime, another firm may use it to record any compensation aside from base pay. In this
section, I present the procedure I use to determine each individual’s overtime pay from the
“OT earnings” variable and its corresponding hours, when available.
I impute overtime pay following the methodology described by Grigsby et al. (2019).
First, I define an implied wage as the ratio between the “OT earnings” and “OT hours”
variables. Next, I divide the implied wage by workers’ actual wage to compute an implied
overtime premium (i.e. OT earnings
OT hours∗wage
), where a salaried worker’s “wage” for overtime purposes
is defined by the Department of Labor as weeklybase
40
. I find that the distribution of the implied
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overtime premium exhibits significant bunching at 1, 1.5, and 2. In particular, among workers
with non-missing ”OT earnings”, 75% of hourly workers and 79% of salaried workers have
implied overtime premiums within 1.4-1.6 and 1.9-2.1. For these workers, the “OT earnings”
variable is likely representative of the earnings they received for all hours worked above 40
in each week of the month. Since hourly workers receive their regular rate of pay regardless
of the overtime premium, I define their monthly overtime pay as the difference between “OT
earnings” and the amount they would earn if there was no overtime premium (i.e. OT pay
= OT earnings − hours∗wage). For salaried workers, their monthly overtime pay is equal
to “OT earnings”. I normalize my measure of monthly overtime pay to the weekly level
following the same procedure for monthly gross pay as described in the previous subsection.
To validate my measure of monthly overtime pay, figure XX plots it against a variable
that records total monthly hours. As a comparison, I also include in the figure the implied
monthly overtime pay of workers’ whose implied overtime premium is outside of 1.4-1.6 and
1.9-2.1.
I find that 45% of hourly workers receive non-zero overtime pay in April 2016, which is 13
p.p. greater than the result by Grigsby et al. (2019) who use a random sample of all worker-
years between May 2008 and December 2016. Among hourly workers who receive overtime,
it accounts for 8.2% of their cumulative gross earnings. In contrast, only 3.5% of salaried
workers received overtime pay in April 2016. To validate my measure of overtime for salaried
workers, I plot in figure D.3 the probability that a salaried worker receives overtime as a
function of their weekly base pay. Consistent with compliance to the overtime regulation, and
potentially selection into bunching, salaried workers earning less than the overtime exemption
are far more likely to receive overtime pay compared to those earning above it. Furthermore,
the probability of receiving overtime in FLSA states in December 2016, and California and
New York in April 2016, exhibits a discontinuous drop in at exactly the threshold.
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Appendix Figure D.3: Probability of Receiving Overtime Pay, Conditional on Base Pay
(a) FLSA states, April 2016 (b) FLSA states, Dec 2016
(c) California, April 2016 (d) New York, April 2016
Notes: Each graph shows the probability that salaried workers receive non-zero overtime pay in
the month, as a function of their weekly base pay. The sample in figure (a) is restricted to salaried
workers not living California, New York or Alaska, in the month April 2016. The sample in figure
(b) is restricted to salaried workers in the same states as figure (a) in December 2016. The sample
in figure (c) is restricted to salaried workers in California in April 2016. The sample in figure (d) is
restricted to salaried workers in New York in April 2016.
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Appendix E. Derivation of Estimator in Equation 3
If the coefficients in equation 2 satisfy
βjk = 0 for every k ≥ k
∗
αjkt = γ1αjk,t−1 + γ0
then for every k < k∗, an unbiased estimator of β is
βˆjk =
(
N¯jk,Dec,t − N¯jk,Apr,t
)
− γˆ1
(
N¯jk,Dec,t−1 − N¯jk,Apr,t−1
)
− γˆ0
= ∆N¯jkt − γˆ1∆N¯jk,t−1 − γˆ0
where N¯jkmt is the average Nijkmt across all firms, and γˆ1 and γˆ0 are estimated using all
salaried workers in bins k ≥ k∗ from
∆N¯sal,kt = γ1∆N¯sal,k,t−1 + γ0 + ǫsal,kt
Proof. For every k ≥ k∗,
N¯jk,Dec,t = N¯jk,Apr,t + αjkt
⇒ ∆N¯jkt = αjkt
⇒ ∆N¯jkt = γ1αjk,t−1 + γ0
⇒ ∆N¯jkt = γ1∆N¯jk,t−1 + γ0
This implies that I can estimate γ1 and γ0 by regressing ∆N¯sal,kt on ∆N¯sal,k,t−1 using all bins
k ≥ k∗. Given the γ’s, I can then predict the αjkt’s for both salaried and hourly workers with
bins k < k∗.
αˆjtk = γˆ1∆N¯jk,t−1 + γˆ0
From equation 2, I estimate the βjk’s as the difference between ∆N¯jkt and αˆjkt.
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Appendix F. Properties of the Flow Decomposition
From the perspective of a given firm i, each worker can be in any one of N = N1 +N2 + 1
states: employed in one of the N1 bins of base pay in the salaried distribution, employed
in one of the N2 bins of base pay in the hourly distribution, or not employed at that firm.
Denote the number of workers in state q ∈ RN at month t by nqt . Between any two months,
t0 and t1, a worker in state q ∈ R
N has a probability pqr of transitioning to state r ∈ R
N .
Given these probabilities and the number of workers in each state in month t0, I can write
the number of of workers in each state in month t1 using a transition matrix:
n
s
t1
nht1
nut1

 =

pss phs puspsh phh puh
psu phu puu



n
s
t0
nht0
nut0


where each element of the matrix is itself a transition matrix. For instance, pss = (psjsk) ∈
R
S1xS1 is a matrix of transition probabilities across the different bins within the salaried
distribution. All the other elements of the transition matrix are similarly defined.
Using the cross-sectional aspect of the data, I observe the number of workers within each
bin of the salaried and hourly distribution in month t0 and t1. From the panel structure of
the data, I also observe the number of workers that transition from state q to r between any
two months: pqrn
q
t0
. To decompose changes in the cross-section into these flows, I expand the
right hand side of the transition matrix equation. For concreteness, I consider a specific bin
j within the salaried distribution, but the argument is the same for any state q ∈ RN .
nsj,t1 =
∑
k
psk,sjn
s
k,t0
+
∑
k
phk,sjn
h
k,t0
+ pu,sjn
u
t0
= psj ,sjn
s
j,t0
+
∑
k 6=j
psk,sjn
s
k,t0
+
∑
k
phk,sjn
h
k,t0
+ pu,sjn
u
t0
= (1−
∑
k 6=j
psj ,sk −
∑
k
psj ,hk − psj ,u)n
s
j,t0
+
∑
k 6=j
psk,sjn
s
k,t0
+
∑
k
phk,sjn
h
k,t0
+ pu,sjn
u
t0
Subtracting both sides by nsj,t0 , the difference in the number of salaried workers at bin j
between t0 and t1 is equal to
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∆nsj = n
s
j,t1
− nsj,t0
= (−
∑
k 6=j
psj ,sk −
∑
k
psj ,hk − psj ,u)n
s
j,t0
+
∑
k 6=j
psk,sjn
s
k,t0
+
∑
k
phk,sjn
h
k,t0
+ pu,sjn
u
t0
= (pu,sjn
u
j,t0
− psj ,un
s
j,t0
)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Net Employment (∆nemp,salj )
+
∑
k
(phk,sjn
h
k,t0
− psj ,hkn
s
j,t0
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Net Reclassification (∆nreclass,salj )
+
∑
k 6=j
(psk,sjn
s
k,t0
− psj ,skn
s
j,t0
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Within-Classification (∆nwithin,salj )
Each component of the above decomposition satisfy three intuitive identities. First, the
sum of flows within a distribution equals zero (i.e. if bin j gains a worker from bin k, then
bin k loses a worker to bin j):
∑
j
∆nwithinj =
∑
j
∑
k 6=j
(psk,sjnk,t0 − psj ,sknj,t0)
= 0
Second, the sum of flows from salaried to hourly, and hourly to salaried equals zero (i.e. if
the salaried distribution gains a worker from the hourly, then the hourly distribution loses a
worker to the salaried):
∑
j
(∆nreclass,salj +∆n
reclass,hr
j ) =
∑
j
(∑
k
(phk,sjn
h
k,t0
− psj ,hkn
s
j,t0
) +
∑
k
(phk,sjn
s
k,t0
− psj ,hkn
h
j,t0
)
)
=
∑
j
∑
k
(phk,sjn
h
k,t0
− psj ,hkn
h
j,t0
) +
∑
j
∑
k
(phk,sjn
s
k,t0
− psj ,hkn
s
j,t0
)
= 0
Third, the sum of the total change in the number of workers in the salaried and hourly
distributions is equal to the sum of the change in net employment.
∑
j
(∆ntotal,salj +∆n
total,hr
j ) =
∑
j
(∆nemp,salj +∆n
emp,hr
j )
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Appendix G. Robustness to Including the 0.1% Largest Firms
There is a trade-off to dropping the largest firms from the sample. On the one hand, the effect
of the policy on medium-sized firms may not be representative of the effect on large firms,
and considering that large firms hire a big segment of the labor force, they are an important
population to study. On the other hand, since the outcome variables are measured in levels,
the estimates of the treatment effects are heavily influenced by any firm-specific policies of
large firms.
In this section, I test whether my econometric model is able to control for fluctuations
in large firms that are unrelated to the 2016 overtime policy. I use the methodology in
section 6.1 to estimate the cumulative treatment effect of the 2016 policy on the frequency
distribution of salaried and hourly workers, using the full sample of firms. To validate whether
the econometric strategy is appropriate for this larger sample, I conduct a placebo test by
estimating the “effect” of the policy on the distributions between 2012 and 2015.
The effect on the salaried distribution appears to be very similar regardless of whether
or not I keep the 0.1% largest firms. I present in figure G.1a the cumulative effect of the
policy on the number of salaried workers in each year while keeping the large firms. The
graph looks remarkably similar to figure 4b where I dropped the largest firms: the policy
reduced the number of salary positions in the average firm by about 2 and had no effect in
the placebo years prior to 2016.
In contrast, the estimates of the effect on the hourly distribution differ significantly once
I include the largest firms. Comparing figure G.1b and 5b, the increase in the number of
hourly workers in the full sample is nearly double that of the truncated sample. However,
the placebo tests in figure G.1b also show much larger deviations from zero than in figure 5b,
particularly below the $455 line. This suggests that the econometric model poorly predicts
the counterfactual hourly distribution of large firms. Given the poor fit of the model, it
is unclear whether large firms actually responded more strongly to the policy. Thus, my
preferred specification drops the 0.1% largest firms.
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Appendix Figure G.1: Effect of Raising the OT Exemption Threshold on the Frequency
Distribution of Weekly Base Pays by Salaried/Hourly Status, Keeping Firms of All Sizes
(a) Placebo Test on Number of Salaried Workers
(b) Placebo Test on Number of Hourly Workers
Notes: Panel (a) shows the cumulative effect of raising the OT exemption threshold on the number
of salaried workers in December of each year between 2012 and 2016. The treatment effect at each
$96.15 bin is estimated using equation 3. Panel (b) presents the analogous graph for the cumulative
effect of the policy on the number of hourly workers. In both graphs, the vertical black and red
lines are at the start of the bins that contain the old and new OT exemption thresholds ($455 and
$913), respectively.
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Appendix H. Difference-in-Difference Results
Appendix Figure H.1: Probability of Unemployment Conditional on Workers Earning Be-
tween $455 and $913 in April 2016 and April 2015
(a) Prob. of Employment, Conditional on Employed at t=0
(b) Diff. in Prob. of Employment Between 2016 and 2015
Notes: In panel (a), the dependent variable is a dummy that equals 1 if a worker is employed at the same firm that they were
working at in April 2015 (control) or April 2016 (treatment). The treatment group consists of all workers who are paid a salary
between $455 and $913 per week in April 2016. The control group are workers who satisfy the same conditions in April 2015.
The x-axis shows the number of months since May 2016 for the treatment group, and May 2015 for the control group. The first
dashed bar is at 0 months from the event date and the second dashed bar is at 7 months after event date. The second dashed
bar corresponds with December 2016 for the treatment group. Panel (b) shows the difference-in-difference estimates between
the employment probabilities of the treatment and control groups in panel (a).
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Appendix Figure H.2: Evolution of Log Base Pay Conditional on Workers Earning Between
$455 and $913 in April 2016 and April 2015
(a) Log Base Pay, Conditional on Employment
(b) Difference in Log Base Pay Between 2016 and 2015
Notes: In panel (a), the dependent variable equals the natural logarithm of worker’s weekly base
pay, averaged by workers in the treatment and control groups. The treatment group consists of all
workers who are paid a salary between $455 and $913 per week in April 2016, and are continuously
employed for a year before and after April 2016. The control group are workers who satisfy the
same conditions in 2015. The x-axis shows the number of months since May 2016 for the treatment
group, and May 2015 for the control group. The first dashed bar is at 0 months from event time and
the second dashed bar is at 7 months after event time. The second dashed bar corresponds with
December 2016 for the treatment group. Panel (b) shows the difference-in-difference coefficients on
log base pay, estimated using equation 5.
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Appendix Figure H.3: Evolution of Log Base Pay Conditional on Workers Earning Between
$913 and $1113 in April 2016 and April 2015
(a) Log Base Pay, Conditional on Employment
(b) Difference in Log Base Pay Between 2016 and 2015
Notes: In panel (a), the dependent variable equals the natural logarithm of worker’s weekly base
pay, averaged by workers in the treatment and control groups. The treatment group consists of all
workers who are paid a salary between $913 and $1113 per week in April 2016, and are continuously
employed for a year before and after April 2016. The control group are workers who satisfy the
same conditions in 2015. The x-axis shows the number of months since May 2016 for the treatment
group, and May 2015 for the control group. The first dashed bar is at 0 months from event time and
the second dashed bar is at 7 months after event time. The second dashed bar corresponds with
December 2016 for the treatment group. Panel (b) shows the difference-in-difference coefficients on
log base pay, estimated using equation 5.
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Appendix Figure H.4: Probability of Being Reclassified to Hourly, 2015 vs. 2016
(a) Prob. of Reclassification, Conditional on Employment
(b) Difference in Probability of Reclassification Between
2016 and 2015
Notes: In panel (a), the dependent variable is a dummy that equals 1 if an individual is an hourly
worker. The treatment group consists of all workers who are paid a salary between $455 and $913
per week in April 2016, and are continuously employed for a year before and after April 2016.
The control group are workers who satisfy the same conditions in April 2015. The x-axis shows the
number of months since May 2016 for the treatment group, and May 2015 for the control group. The
first dashed bar is at 0 month from event time and the second dashed bar is at 7 months after event
time. The second dashed bar corresponds with December 2016 for the treatment group. Panel (b)
shows the difference-in-difference coefficients on the probability of reclassification, estimated using
equation 5.
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Appendix I. Analysis using the Current Population Survey
There are many advantages of the ADP data over traditional survey data. Foremost for
the purposes of studying the overtime exemption policy is that it records workers’ base
salaries without measurement error, for a very large sample of workers. These features make
it possible to compare the distribution of salaries over time with minimal concern that
differences are driven by measurement error or changes in the sample population. A limitation
of the ADP data though is that it does not record the hours worked by salaried workers.
Hence, a natural response would be to supplement the main analysis by using survey data,
such as the Current Population Survey (CPS), to estimate the effect of raising the overtime
exemption threshold on workers’ weekly hours. However, I show that the CPS is unable to
even pick up the clear bunching and reclassifications effects identified from the ADP data.
Appendix Figure I.1: Frequency Distribution of Salaried Workers in $2 Bins of Weekly Earn-
ings, by Date
Notes: This figure shows the frequency distribution of respondents’ usual weekly earnings in the
CPS. The sample is restricted to individuals who are not paid an hourly wage, and earn between
$851 and $950 per week. The dotted vertical red line is at $913 per week.
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To begin, I plot the frequency distributions of weekly earnings of salaried workers for each
month between May 2016 and April 2017 in figure I.1. The number of respondents earning
within a dollar of $913 per week experiences a visibly small jump between November and
December 2016 that persists after December.49 In the year prior to December 2016, 0.09%
of salaried workers report earning within a dollar of $913, whereas in the year after, 0.37%
report earning within that interval. However, the “bunching” at the threshold is considerably
smaller than the other spikes in the distribution. This is inconsistent with the result in figure
2a wherein the spike at the new overtime exemption threshold is the largest spike along the
entire distribution in December 2016.
Replicating figures 2a and 2b, I try to isolate the dip and bunching by taking the difference
in the earnings distributions before and after the policy. Given that there are on average only
4,470 salaried workers surveyed per month, I construct the post-policy distribution by pooling
all observations between December 2016 and April 2017, and the pre-policy distribution using
all observations in the analogous months in the previous year. The two distributions, overlaid
in figure I.2 look very similar. Furthermore, the difference between the distributions do not
exhibit the clear dip and bunching observed using the ADP data. While there is a drop in the
number of salaried workers earning between $455 and $912 and an increase in the number
of workers earning exactly $913 from 2015 to 2016, the same is also true from 2014 to 2015.
Overall, I am unable to find definitive evidence of large bunching using the CPS data.
The absence of bunching in the CPS data may be attributed to measurement error in
the weekly earnings variable. For example, respondents may tend to round their reported
earnings to the nearest $1000 annual income or $100 weekly income. Alternatively, when
asked their “usual” weekly earnings, respondents may report their most common weekly
earnings over the past year, rather than their weekly earnings in the month that they are
surveyed. Given these concerns over measurement error in reported earnings, the CPS may
be more suited to identifying reclassification effects.
In figure I.3, I plot the proportion of respondents earning who report being paid per hour.
I find no visible evidence of a trend break in the probability of hourly status between May
2016 and December 2016 for those earning between $400 and $1000 per week. To control for
date-specific effects, I estimate a difference-in-difference where I assume that the proportion
of hourly workers among those earning between $1000 and $1200 per week follows the same
trend as those earning between $400 and $1000 per week. I do not find any effect of the
49The “bunching” is actually at $913.46 per week, corresponding to an annual salary of $47, 500.
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policy on the share of hourly workers under this specification.
One concern with restricting the sample within each cross-section to only workers who
earn between $400 and $1000 per week is that the policy might affect the selection of workers
into this sample. To address this issue, I leverage the panel structure of the CPS data to
identify the change within-worker over one year. First, I restrict the sample to workers who, in
their first survey, report being non-hourly, and earning between $455 and $913. Given that the
reclassification and bunching effects estimated from the ADP data are largest in December
2016 (see fig H.4), there should be a jump in the share of hourly workers among those who
completed their second survey between December 2016 and February 2016. However, figure
I.4 shows no trend break in the share of workers who transition to hourly status in December
2016. Instead, I find a large jump in hourly workers among the September to November
2016 respondents. Comparing salaried workers initially earning between $455 and $913 per
week to salaried workers initially earning between $913 and $1200, I find no statistically
significant differences in their probabilities of becoming hourly in December 2016. While
not reported, I also find no earnings effect from the cohort-by-cohort difference-in-difference.
These observations are inconsistent with the results from the main analysis.
In summary, I am unable to replicate the key results found in the ADP data using the
CPS, due to a combination of measurement error and small sample size. Given that the CPS
cannot identify the bunching or reclassification effects, it is not surprising that I also do not
find any significant changes to weekly hours worked among salaried workers around the time
of the policy.50 Overall, the CPS is simply too imprecise and small to study the effects of
raising the overtime exemption threshold on the labor market.
50Graphs available upon request.
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Appendix Figure I.2: Difference in Distribution of Salaried Workers Before and After Raising
the OT Exemption Threshold, Using CPS
(a) Distribution of Salaried Workers’ Weekly Earnings
(b) Difference in Distribution Pre and Post Policy
Notes: Panel (a) shows the frequency distribution of salaried workers’ weekly earnings in $40 bins,
reported in the CPS. The distribution in the pre-period is constructed using all respondents between
December 2015 and April 2016. The post-period is constructed using all respondents between
December 2016 and April 2015. The “2016” line in panel (b) shows the difference between the
pre and post distributions in panel (a). The “2015” line shows the difference between the pre-
distribution and the analogous distribution of salaried workers from December 2014 and April
2015.
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Appendix Figure I.3: Difference in Difference of Probability of Being Paid Hourly Using
Repeated Cross Sections, Using CPS
(a) Probability of Being Paid Hourly, by Date
(b) Diff-in-diff for Hourly Status Indicator
Notes: Panel (a) shows the probability that an individual in the CPS is paid an hourly wage for each
month between January 2010 and September 2019, conditional on weekly earnings. The two dotted
vertical lines are at May 2016 and December 2016, respectively. Panel (b) shows the difference in
difference estimates where I compare workers earnings earning between $400 and $1000 per week
to workers earning between $1000 and $1200 per week.
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Appendix Figure I.4: Annual Change in Hourly/Salaried Status, Conditional on Initially Earning Between $455 and $913 per
Week as a Salaried Worker
(a) Hourly Status, by Cohort
(b) Change in Hourly Status, by Earnings
(c) Difference-in-Difference of Hourly Status
Notes: In panel (a), the sample is restricted to workers who answered both outgoing rotation group surveys, and in their first CPS ORG
survey, reported earning between $455 and $913 per week, and paid non-hourly. Each point represents the average response across all
respondents in three consecutive surveys, starting with the month on the x-axis corresponding to that point. Each line connects the
average response answered by the same panel of workers. In panel (b), the blue line is the difference between each pair of points in panel
(a), plotted against the date of the second survey. The red line is the analogous graph for workers earning between $913 and $1200 in
their first survey. Panel (c) plots the difference-in-difference estimates corresponding to the normalized difference between the two graphs
in panel (b), computed using monthly data.
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